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I. INTRODUCTION
Conceptions of property often begin with the proposition that the individual owns
his or her own self—that “every man has a property in his own person.”2 In the
consumer contracting context, however, the growth of information technologies that
permit the collection, processing, copying and dissemination of vast amounts of
personal information threatens this concept of exclusive ownership and control of the
self.3 Specifically, producers4 in the information era have the ability to collect
extraordinarily detailed personal information about individual consumers and then
use that data to develop a high-definition electronic double—a doppelganger5—of
those individuals.6 Producers can then use this electronic reflection of a consumer’s
interests, wants, habits and needs, to invade a consumer’s control over personal

2
John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government (1690), in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 413 (Edwin A.
Burtt, ed. 1939) (“Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every
man has a property in his own person. This nobody has any right to but himself.”); see also
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 54-59 (1995) (arguing in favor of
self-ownership as fundamental rule for building system of property rights).
3
See Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1326-32 (1992)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Data Processing] (noting dangers to individualism and relations
between individual and state presented by pre-Internet, industrial-age information collection
and processing technologies).
4

In analyzing bargaining power relations, I have adopted Professor W. David Slawson’s
definitions of “producer” – a person who produces products, including both goods and
services, for sale – and “consumer” – a person, including individuals and businesses, who
buys a product to consume it. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES 24 (1996).
5

In German mythology, the doppelganger was an evil spirit that took on the form of an
individual, the appearance of which usually foretold impending doom for that individual.
Alternatively, the doppelganger is a literary device used to demonstrate that each individual’s
“self” actually comprises multiple, schismatic reflections of the same person. See ANDREW J.
WEBBER, THE DOPPELGANGER: DOUBLE VISIONS IN GERMAN LITERATURE 1-12 (1996)
(surveying characteristics of doppelgangers in literature and noting the story of Dr. Jekyll and
Mr. Hyde as one prominent example of the use of doppelgangers).
6
For a detailed analysis of the development of electronic personae by government and
private organizations, see generally Patricia Mell, Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual
Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1 (1996).
Of course, individuals also can use the online environment to recreate their own identities and
craft online personae that reflect an idealized version of their selves to the outside world. See
Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Privacy, 7 YALE J. L. & TECH. 222, 252 (2004) (“Even outside of
structured forums, a user can adopt a multiplicity of gender, sexual, racial, or other categorical
identities, invent accompanying personal histories, and engage in an assortment of acts that
she would probably not perform in real life. [V]irtual space allows individuals to construct
identities they choose for themselves . . . .”).
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choices and interests. The doppelganger identifies the targets most susceptible to
particular products and pitches, assists the producer in making the sale, and perhaps
even suggests means of exploiting known cognitive biases that can interfere with
free and rational choice by the consumer. And, most importantly, the doppelganger
is the property of the producer or data miner who created it—individual consumers
currently have no power to restrict or control others’ uses of these electronic
manifestations of their selves.
This propertization of personal information accompanies an increasing
disconnect between consumer contracts in practice and classical notions of contract
as consensual, bargained-for agreements. Contract scholars have been more or less
obsessed with the non-dickered, adhesive nature of standardized form contracts for
much of the last century.7 The modern reality of highly sophisticated forms of
adhesion contract—browse-wrap and click-wrap contracts8–appears to exacerbate
the lack of assent and take-it-or-leave-it nature of consumer adhesion contracts. As
some commentators have noted, the fiction of consumer assent to such new forms of

7
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211, 240 (1995) (“The problems raised by the use of form contracts have been a
major preoccupation of contract law scholars for the past forty years. The primary areas of
concern have been the enforceability of preprinted terms and the import of preprinted terms in
determining whether a form sent in response to an offer constitutes an acceptance.”); see also
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70
U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204-06 (2003); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract:
The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 23-46
(1984) (analyzing meaning of contract in light of changed social and economic conditions and
surveying scholarly responses to standard form contracting phenomenon); Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1242-51 (1983)
(arguing against enforceability of non-salient terms in adhesion contracts); Freidrich Kessler,
Contracts of Adhesion – Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629,
640 (1943) (“Standard contracts in particular could . . . become effective instruments in the
hands of powerful industrial and commercial overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal
order of their own making upon a host of vassals.”); cf. Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of
Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34, 39 (1917) (criticizing continued reliance on freedom of contract
principles in light of growing use of adhesion contracts).
8
Browse-wrap contracts comprise attempts by website owners to bind site visitors to the
website’s “Terms of Service” or “Conditions of Use” by presenting a hyperlink to view such
terms together with an assertion that use of the website constitutes acceptance of those terms.
Click-wrap contracts differ in that the user is presented with a screen containing contract terms
to which he must assent by clicking a hyperlink before he can proceed. See, e.g., James J.
Tracy, Legal Update, Browse Wrap Agreements: Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 11 B.U. J.
SCI. & TECH. L. 164, 164-65 (2005) (describing click-wrap and browse-wrap contracts and
noting that recent cases suggest greater willingness by courts to enforce some browse-wrap
contracts); Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1129 (2000) [hereinafter Radin, Binding Commitment] (describing onerous terms of
service or conditions of use that commercial websites attempt to impose upon all site visitors);
Batya Goodman, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an
Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319, 333-34 (1999) (describing click-wrap
agreements as requiring “the purchaser to use his or her mouse to ‘click’ on buttons appearing
on the computer screen, thereby assenting to the terms and conditions”).
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adhesion contracts is even more absurd than with their paper-based counterpart.9 Just
as with the relatively crude paper-based contracts, few consumers ever bother to read
these terms, and the nature of online contracting permits producers to hide their
boilerplate terms far more effectively than even the finest of fine prints.10
Consequently, some have suggested contract law should abandon models of contract
based upon assent in favor of recognizing contract terms as part of the product being
bought and sold.11
Taken together, these phenomena appear to suggest that the traditional
conception of a property interest in the self has become—at least in the consumer
contracting context—wholly fictional. The consumer no longer exclusively “owns”
her own self because producers and data miners have access to an electronic
simulation of that consumer, an evil twin who can often tell them which cognitive,
emotional, and appetitive buttons to push to manipulate the consumer.12 Similarly,
producers also know in a general manner how to pressure the consumer to give
“assent” to the producer’s preferred contract terms by manipulating the transaction
costs involved in reading, understanding, and seeking alternatives to those contract
terms.13 To the extent that these qualities represent proxies for the “self” at the basis

9
See Radin, Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1125 (“Commercial practice has long
deviated from the traditional picture of minds meeting about terms or autonomous consent.”);
Goodman, supra note 8, at 319-22 (noting lack of notice to consumer of shrink-wrap or clickwrap terms and likelihood that consumer fails to read such terms).
10
Browse-wrap contracts, for example, require web surfers to take affirmative steps to seek
out a set of terms and conditions that they are unlikely to read in the first place. See Radin,
Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1129 (describing, inter alia, www.Disney.com web site
in which terms of use link appears in small print at bottom of page where most users would
not likely scroll or bother to click on the link). Professor Radin notes that the Disney.com
terms of use, despite their relative obscurity on the website, nonetheless purport to condition
use of the site on a complete waiver of all rights in any intellectual property uploaded to the
site’s discussion forums and impose a forum selection clause upon all disputes. See id. (noting
several apparently onerous browse-wrap contracts).
11

See Radin, Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1125-26 (suggesting “contract-asproduct” model better describes “much of transactional practice” better than consent-based
models of contract).
12
See PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 39 (1996).
[Computer] data processing creates a potential for suppressing a capacity for free
choice. The more that is known about an individual, the easier it is to force his
obedience. Through the use of databanks, the state and private organizations can
transform themselves into omnipotent parents and the rest of society into helpless
children.
Id.; see also Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (2001) (quoting SCHWARTZ &
REIDENBERG).
13
See Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 466 (2002) (“Internet design companies consult
traditional marketing gurus, but also cognitive psychologists and anthropologists in an effort
to maximize the number of site visitors and to induce these visitors to engage in the desired
responses.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 216-25 (surveying categories of known
cognitive biases that limit ability of parties to make fully rational contract decisions, including
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of property, the information age appears to be not only propertizing the consumer’s
identity and will,14 but also giving property rights in those qualities to producers and
data harvesters, not the consumer whose personality, desires and choices generated
that electronic double.15
This Article argues that the threatening consequences of this commodification
and propertization of consumers’ electronic selves represent only part of the picture.
Information era technological developments provide more tools than ever available
before by which consumers can place boundaries around their right to consent and
exclude others from that arena.16 Thus, Internet-based contracting allows consumers
to access a broad range of bargaining power inputs to protect their power to withhold
consent.17 Instead of an amorphous, indefinable quality of contracting parties,
bargaining power may now be characterized as a series of discrete inputs that can be
identified, evaluated, exchanged and owned.18 In essence, bargaining power may be
treated as property or a commodity that in turn serves as a protection against
unwanted manifestations of the self through coerced or unwitting exercises of
consent.
This analogy of creating property rights in bargaining power and consent is
intriguing, not because of the potential that these ephemeral concepts are property,
but rather because it may help refocus the way that we think about bargaining power,
personal responsibility and the ability of consumers to continue participating in a
meaningful way with transactions in the information era. Internet-based contracting
allows a much more finely-grained picture of the bargaining power of the parties. In
the classical contract model of two “farmers haggling over the sale of a horse,”19 for
example, every transaction is a unique occurrence that cannot be replicated.
Traditional judicial approaches to the phenomenon of bargaining power reflect this
uniqueness, generally treating consumer bargaining power as an all-or-nothing affair
overoptimism, framing effects, information availability, undersampling available data,
inability to assess future costs and benefits, and underestimation of risks).
14
Cf. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423-28 (2000) (arguing that strong protections of personal data privacy
are necessary for the development of autonomous individuals through the exercise of free,
unmonitored choices).
15
See Andrew McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response
to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 142 (2003) (“Our data selves have
become commodities, bought and sold like bags of potato chips.”).
16

Cf. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in
Facilitating a Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 398 (2005) (“The commodity
metaphor [in the intellectual property and creative works context] creates an abstract ‘fence’
around (abstract) informational goods. While we may easily build a fence to keep others off
our land, we cannot keep others from playing a musical composition hundreds of miles
away.”).
17

See infra Part III.B.3.

18

See infra Part IV.A.

19

See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 454 (1908) (“Why do we find
a great and learned court in 1908 taking the long step into the past of dealing with the relation
between employer and employee in railway transportation, as if the parties were individuals –
as if they were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse?”).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

5

74

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:69

measured on the basis of a few crude heuristics such as availability of meaningful
alternatives, necessity, wealth, gender, education and organizational size.20
Measurement of the effect of various bargaining power inputs upon the quality of the
outcome for one or both of the parties under the classical paradigm is impossible.
Although we cannot understand completely the bargaining power of transacting
parties in the information era, it is easier to identify the existence of multiple,
discrete bargaining power inputs and assess their relative value across similar
transactions. First, information era contracting is standardized21 to an extent the
market can commodify many potential bargaining power inputs.
Second,
information and transaction costs can be reduced to the point where individual
consumers can identify and access these bargaining power tools and information.22
Consequently, by treating bargaining power as comprising many different but
identifiable and discrete components, external observers such as courts, legislatures
and commentators can craft a more detailed and textured picture of the power
relationship between the parties than was possible before the information era.
The propertization analogy is also intriguing for reconceptualizing bargaining
power and consent. By treating bargaining power as a fence or wall with which
consumers guard their power to grant or withhold consent, we create a framework in
which it is easier to observe that both sides possess bargaining power. Notably,
many of the responses to information era contracting have been strongly
paternalistic23 and often—explicitly or implicitly—characterize the consumer as
powerless in transactions with producers.24 Although there may be situations in
which state policing and regulation are appropriate to protect against absolute
disparities of bargaining power, recognizing the potential for bargaining power on
the consumer side of the transaction is crucial for maintaining the personal
responsibility that makes individual access to contract possible.

20
See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139,
199-223 (2005) (surveying factors used by courts in analyzing power relationship between
bargaining parties).
21

See Margaret Jane Radin, Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and
Machine, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1138-46 (2002) [hereinafter Radin, Online
Standardization] (noting that “the online environment facilitates standardization in various
ways” at the same time it promotes customization of other aspects of the consumer-producer
relationship).
22

See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1037 (1999) (“Not only is more personal
information available now than ever before, but it is becoming easier and less expensive to
obtain access to it. . . . Prices for many services are now at the point where information that
formerly could be afforded only by businesses is not accessible to individuals.”).
23

But see Hillman & Rachlinksi, supra note 13, at 486-95 (“Although the electronic
environment is a truly novel advance in the history of consumerism, existing contract law is up
to the challenge.”).
24

See, e.g., Solove, supra note 12, at 1393 (arguing in favor of privacy law metaphors
based upon Franz Kafka’s “The Trial” that emphasize “the powerlessness, vulnerability, and
dehumanization created by the assembly of dossiers of personal information where individuals
lacking any form of participation in the collection and use of their information”).
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Part II explores some of the characteristics of consumer contracting in the
information age and some of the legal responses to the issues of information
propertization, consumer privacy, and assent that are raised in that context. In Part
III, this Article surveys the relationship between consumer bargaining power and the
ability of individuals to control manifestations of their selves through contract. In
contrast to crude contract-based notions of bargaining power, this Part develops a
model of negotiating strength or weakness based upon the propertization metaphor
that currently informs much of the intellectual property and privacy literature.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the ramifications of that propertization metaphor for future
developments in legal conceptions of bargaining power in the consumer-producer
relationship.
II. CONSUMER CONTRACTING IN THE INFORMATION ERA
A. Characteristics of Consumer Contracting in the Information Age
The Internet is a dangerous place for consumers, at least according to many
commentators.
Amoral producers hawk their wares to unsuspecting and
unsophisticated e-consumers who innocently enter the dark alleys of electronic
commerce, lured by the siren call of bright and flashing neon signs promising
selection, price and convenience.25 Once there, the e-producer wraps an arm around
the e-consumer’s shoulder in a faux-friendly embrace and appears to recognize her
by name,26 suggesting some wares for which his data-mining shill has indicated
she’ll pay top dollar.27
As she shops, the producer keeps track of everywhere she looks28 and gently asks
for her most personal information29–he’ll make some good money selling this

25
See, e.g., Anil M. Pandya, B2C Failures: Toward an Innovation Theory Framework, J.
ELECT. COMM. IN ORG., Apr.-June 2005, at 73 (showing that e-commerce “reduces search
costs . . . [and] is convenient, quick, easily accessible, and less expensive”); Rajiv Kohli et al.,
Understanding Determinants of Online Customer Satisfaction: A Decision Process
Perspective, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 21 no. 1., Summer 2004, at 115, 120 (noting that
consumers achieve significant cost savings from online retail through both lower prices overall
and savings “by purchasing products with the precise features they need, thereby not having to
pay for features they do not need”).
26
See Rajiv Dewan, Bing Jin & Abraham Seidmann, Adoption of Internet-Based Product
Customization and Pricing Strategies, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 17 no. 2, Fall 2000, at 9, 23
(“The incredible communications and computing power of the Internet and other information
processing technologies such as cookies and collaborative filtering is handing companies an
unprecedented opportunity to collect and analyze consumer information. The Internet allows
sellers to understand their customers’ needs and wants on an individual basis.”)
27
See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055,
2056-57 (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data] (“Personal
information is an important currency in the new millennium. The monetary value of personal
data is large and still growing, and corporate America is moving quickly to profit from the
trend.”).
28

See id. at 1625 (“Once Web sites identify a specific visitor, they can match her to their
rich stores of ‘clickstream data,’ which is information about the precise path a user takes while
browsing at a Web site, including how long she spent at any part of a site.”); Jessica Litman,
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information to even more unscrupulous, bottom-feeding data miners30 or use it
himself the next time she visits.31 Amazed that the producer seemed able to read her
mind, to know her every desire,32 the mark ogles the merchandise and doesn’t even
notice that she has spent far more time than she thought examining the goods.33
Finally, she makes a selection and the slick huckster cleverly slips a few pages in
Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2000) (“Everything
we look at on the Internet is noted and retained.”).
29
See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609,
1621-32 (1999) (describing “privacy horror show” in which personal information about email
communications, web browsing activity, interactions with various online content providers,
Internet Service Providers, and data miners who place malicious spyware on users’ personal
computers to harvest users’ personal data); see also Joan Stableford, Retailers Capture Buyers
Online with Advanced Technology, WESTCHESTER COUNTY BUS. J., July 25, 2005, at 15
(“Every time a person shops on the Web site, Lillian Vernon tracks the history of what the
shopper buys and what types of merchandise a person views in detail, Shapiro said. The next
time a shopper goes to the site, the Web site engine remembers what a shopper purchased and
what types of merchandise the shopper was interested in. The next time they land on the Web
site, those types of items will be automatically highlighted on the home page.”).
30
See Sovern, supra note 22, at 1045-46 (noting that “some companies reportedly earn
more from selling customer lists them from selling their own goods and services”).
31
See, e.g., Matthew Haeberle, Innovation Wins in E-Retail, CHAIN STORE AGE, Dec. 2004,
at 92 (“When we recognize that a customer who is a time-compressed mom is on our site, we
customize our messaging to her and show her promos for digital cameras and DVDs that we
think she will like . . . . We also tell her about our local store that is catered to her, and the kids
area it features.”) (quoting Sam Taylor, senior VP of on-line stores at Best Buy Co.).
32

See Litman, supra note 28, at 1283-84 (“All of this information is collected, aggregated,
and stored on computers. . . . The resulting dossier may be used, sold, published, or correlated
with other sources of data.”); Dewan et al., supra note 26, at 10 (“The Internet allows the
buyer and the seller to interact on a one-to-one basis and allows the seller to collect
information from online user registration, cookies, log pages of the Web server, etc. This,
combined with a collaborative filtering and data mining, allows the seller to design products
for individuals. On-line sellers are using these technologies to target their most valuable
prospects effectively with personalized messages and products[].”).
33

The claims of some Web marketing specialists are chilling in this respect. See, e.g., PR
Newswire, Coremetrics and Offermatica Partner to Boost Online Conversion through
Targeted A/B and Multivariate Testing, Apr. 4, 2005, http://global.factiva.com/ha/default.aspx
(press release from Web site testing and optimization firms touting ability to use online
customer and visitor behavior to fine tune web pages to increase customer conversions).
“Marketers need to know with certainty which online content will increase the odds
that visitors will become customers,” said Offermatica CEO Matthew Roche.
“Coremetrics provides the data that powers precision marketing. Offermatica takes
this data and automatically generates combinations of Web site content to determine
which version will have the greatest impact on sales and profitability. Guessing
doesn’t work. Knowing does.”
Id. (providing testimonial on apparent relation between being able “to quickly test 81 different
combinations of 4 key elements on our home page to find the best combination of promotions
and copy. This made a huge impact – we saw an almost 20% lift in conversions by making
one simple change to the call to action on our main navigation zone. With Coremetrics and
Offermatica, my site is becoming an acquisition weapon.”).
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front of her with an outstretched pen – “just sign here, ma’am”34 – and she is out the
door with her new purchase.
The information culture self-consciously defines itself35 by the technologies that
permit the collection, processing and dissemination of vast amounts of data.36 In the
consumer context, this information capacity permits marketers and producers to
create detailed electronic dossiers37 of a consumer’s interests, wants, habits and
needs. The reality of consumer life in the information era is that marketers, data
miners, and producers collect, process, and store incredible amounts of data about
everything a consumer does online. This includes the Internet searches a consumer
performed, web sites visited, items viewed, purchases made, as well as any personal
data surrendered by the consumer in the course of his or her shopping.38 Likewise,
many offline interactions between consumers and producers generate a wealth of
information on the consumer’s habits and preferences that may be collated with the
online persona. In the information era, consumer activities are transparent and
known by those who can pay for that knowledge, and in most cases consumers have
no control over how others use their personal information.39
Producers use these electronic dossiers to identify consumers least likely to resist
their marketing efforts, to design and market products most likely to entice the
consumer into purchasing, and to lower the consumer’s resistance to granting
consent to a proffered transaction.40

34

See supra notes 8-11 and text accompanying (describing problems of assent in context of
click-wrap and browse-wrap adhesion contracts).
35
See, e.g., Seth Godin, The New Digital Divide, Seth’s Blog, May 7, 2005,
http://sethgodin.typepad.com/seths_blog/2005/05/the_new_digital.html (describing emergence
of a new class of sophisticated information technology users called “digiterati” who choose to
be on the cutting edge of new information technologies).
36
See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2056 (“Modern
computing technologies and the Internet have generated the capacity to gather, manipulate,
and share massive quantities of data; this capacity, in turn, has spawned a booming trade in
personal information.”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996) (describing information and data copying and
dissemination capacities of the Internet as “continu[ing] a trend that began when Gutenberg
invented movable type”).
37

See Litman, supra note 28, at 1284 (describing scope of information collected on every
aspect of consumer transactions and noting “[t]he resulting dossier may be used, sold,
published, or correlated with other sources of data”).
38
Many websites, for example, ask consumers directly to provide personal information in
exchange for some purported benefit such as the ability to receive future emails with “special
offers,” news about the purchase, a discount, faster processing on a rebate or just the
producer’s ability “to serve you better.” And to complete an order in either the online or
offline context, of course, the consumer must divulge sufficient personal information to
complete the order fulfillment process.
39
See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 113033 (2000) (“[T]he law does not generally recognize the legal right of individuals to control
uses or disclosures of personal data.”).
40
See, e.g., Dewan et al., supra note 26, at 11, 23-24 (“The incredible communications and
computing power of the Internet and other information processing technologies such as
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Almost worse than the absolute transparency of our commercial activities is that
we willingly acquiesce in the system of collection and exploitation, often to the point
of active promotion. Consumers themselves directly assist producers and data
miners in collecting this information by agreeing to provide that information to a
producer whenever they browse the Internet, purchase online, register purchased
products, sign up for frequent shoppers’ cards at their grocery store, fill in
sweepstakes cards, and engage in the myriad other activities of informational life.41
As one commentator notes, commerce between producers and consumers now
comprises “an exchange of goods or services for money and information.”42
Moreover, consumers remain only vaguely aware that producers and data miners
collect this information, unaware of the scope of the information collected, and
generally unaware that producers and data miners usually disseminate their private
information to anyone willing to pay for it.43 A recent Annenberg Public Policy
Center report on consumer awareness of online information gathering practices, for
cookies and collaborative filtering is handing companies an unprecedented opportunity to
collect and analyze customer information. The Internet allows sellers to understand their
customers needs and wants on an individual basis.”).
41

Professor Jessica Litman offers an especially chilling description of the scope of such
data collection:
Almost everything each of us does seems to generate transactional information.
Walks [a]round the block are still unrecorded, except in those communities with
cameras. Interactions that begin and end and stay within the home are still largely
unreported, although everything entering and leaving by way of the phone lines, cable
lines, satellite dishes or wireless, non-broadcast spectrum is documented. Non-cash
purchases are memorialized and toted up. Large cash purchases are memorialized and
turned in. Cash withdrawals and deposits are recorded and saved. Visits to the doctor,
diagnoses, prescriptions, and referrals are coded and passed along. Everything we
look at on the Internet is noted and retained. All of this information is collected,
aggregated, and stored on computers. Anyone with reason to do so can correlate the
information stored on one computer with the information stored on another, and
another, and another. The resulting dossier may be used, sold, published, or correlated
with other sources of data. In the United States, that’s completely legal.
Litman, supra note 28, at 1283-84.
42

Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2402 (1996) (“[T]he typical transaction between a merchant or
seller and a consumer increasingly can be characterized as an exchange of goods or services
for money and information.”); see also Tal Zarsky, Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using
Implementation-Based Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data
Mining and the Internet Society, 56 ME. L. REV. 13, 20-21 (2004) (arguing in favor of viewing
data collection as “a transaction between the collector and the collectee rather than collection
of information from a passive subject” and suggesting we are selling a piece of ourselves to
collectors in exchange for convenience and other benefits); Sovern, supra note 22, at 1040-43
(quoting and expanding upon Murphy’s characterization).
43

See Frank Main, Your Phone Records Are For Sale, SUN-TIMES (Chicago), Jan. 6, 2004,
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-privacy05.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006) (“To
test the [cell phone records] service, the FBI paid Locatecell.com $160 to buy the records for
an [FBI] agent’s cell phone and received the list within three hours. . . .”); see also Sovern,
supra note 22, at 1035 (relating test case in which reporter obtained profiles of neighborhood
children from data service while posing as a child molester who was on trial at the time of the
request).
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example, shows that a majority of online consumers do not know that charities and
supermarkets can and do sell their personal information to other companies,44 that
website “privacy policies” do not mean the websites will not share personal
information with other websites and companies,45 or that Internet sites engage in
price discrimination based upon consumer profiles.46 Worst of all, while consumers
reported substantial concern with their ability to control use of their private
information, “[i]n the face of all this nervousness and seeming confusion, it is
startling that 65% of Internet-using adult Americans nevertheless say they ‘know
what I have to do to protect myself from being taken advantage of by sellers on the
web.’”47
B. Legal Responses to Information Era Consumer Contracting – Privacy and Assent
These technological developments surrounding consumer contracting in the
information age have generated substantial concern for contract, intellectual property
and privacy law scholars. In response to these phenomena, intellectual property and
privacy law commentators have variously called for greater protections for
individual privacy48 and tools that protect consumers from enforcement of perceived
unfair or unreasonable terms.49 Individual information should either be propertized50
44

See JOSEPH TUROW ET AL., ANNENBERG PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, OPEN TO EXPLOITATION:
AMERICAN SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE 3 (2005) (reporting 72% of American adults
unaware that charities may sell names to other charities without permission, and 64% were
unaware that supermarkets may sell personal information about buying habits to other
companies).
45
Id. (“75% do not know the correct response – false – to the statement, ‘When a website
has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my information with other websites and
companies.’”).
46

See id. at 3-4.

47

Id. at 4.

48

See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2094-116 (2004)
(describing five necessary characteristics of successful system of property rights in personal
information); Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1130-36 (surveying arguments in favor of creating
property rights in personal information); Sovern, supra note 22, at 1074-81, 1094-116 (1999)
(noting that producers have incentives to increase transaction costs for consumers attempting
to protect their private information and suggesting mandatory regime in which consumers
must affirmatively opt to permit third parties to use and sell their personal data); Mell, supra
note 6, at 68-76 (suggesting that individuals should have a strong property interest in their
personal information to control the uses to which third parties put that information).
49

See Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 430-31(“Lawmakers and theorists currently
are debating the need for a new set of rules to support these innovative transactions.”); John J.
A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285,
286-88 & 308-12 (2000) (describing need for regulation of standard form contracting practices
in both online and real world environments); Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at
1145 (noting that characteristics of online contracting may lead to erosion of the “traditional
understanding of contract”); see also Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1244-55 (noting market
failures affecting form contracts generally and surveying possible regulatory and judicial
responses to such market failures).
50
See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324-25 (1967) (“[P]ersonal
information, thought of as the right of decision over one’s private personality, should be

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

11

80

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:69

– so that it can be restricted, guarded, alienated, or transferred in a market – or
rendered inalienable and inviolate.51 Privacy torts and statutory schemes should be
strengthened.52 Alternatively, computerized databases and other collections of
personal data should be freely copiable without restrictions based upon contractual
licenses.53
Similarly, on the contract side, this view of information era contracting
challenges the continued legitimacy of contract models based upon volitional
bargaining and individualized assent to contract terms.54 Contract law commentators

defined as a property right, with all the restraints on interference by public or private
authorities and due-process guarantees that our law of property has been so skillful in
devising.”); see also Zarsky, supra note 42; Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data,
supra note 27, at 2094 (suggesting bundle of rights property model for personal data); Julia
Gladstone, Data Mines and Battlefields: Looking at Financial Aggregators to Understand the
Legal Boundaries and Ownership Rights in the Use of Personal Data, 19 J. MARSHALL J.
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 328-29 (2001) (arguing that consumer information “belongs” to
consumer, who has a fundamental right to his privacy and should have that information
protected as a property right).
51
See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability and the Regulation of Spyware, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1269, 1269-72 (2005) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy Inalienability]
(arguing in favor of a “hybrid inalienability” model of privacy that restricts alienability of
private consumer information unless consumer affirmatively opts to permit use of information
by collector).
52

See Litman, supra note 28, at 1302-11 (arguing that property-based models for
protection of individual privacy offer “only illusory protections” and suggesting instead tort
protections based upon breach of trust); Samuelson, supra note 39, at 1136-46 (arguing that a
property rights based scheme for protection of personal information would be problematic
because of the complexities of establishing a market infrastructure for information trades and
prevention of unauthorized transfers, dissimilarities between property rights in personal
information and other types of intellectual property, and lack of congressional authority to
establish such a property rights system and suggesting instead direct regulation of information
trade); Katyal, supra note 6, at 338-44 (suggesting legislative program to protect individual
privacy rights against invasion by copyright holders seeking evidence of copyright violations).
53
See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 42, at 2381-82 (surveying rights-based and law and
economics-based challenges to privacy rights); William M. McGeveran, Note, Programmed
Privacy Responses: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1812, 1822-26 (2001)
(noting importance of and benefits from disclosure and free flow of private information on
Internet); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 755-57 (1999)
(analyzing proper limits of regulation of privacy rights in light of needs of liberal society, but
noting “Coercing privacy in the strong sense of dictating what people must always keep to
themselves and what they may disclose to others would threaten the liberal egalitarian ideal of
tolerance.”). But see Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights and Misrepresentations, 12
GA. L. REV. 455, 462-64 (1978) (characterizing invasion of privacy as relatively unimportant
tort).
54
See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1295-96 (1998) (arguing that Realist
observation that “there can be no free-standing purely ‘private’ regime of property and
contract” should be reiterated in cyberspace). But see Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at
430 (noting that most commentators on contracting in Internet era agree “that the existing law
is inadequate, but disagree about what changes need to be made” but concluding that in
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have argued that consumer assent and bargaining power are fictions, particularly in
the Internet context.55 The Internet-based consumer contract appears to stretch the
volitional nature of contract past the breaking point through the use of browse-wrap
and click-wrap terms, and to deprive e-consumers of all bargaining power except the
naked ability to walk away from the deal. As Professor Radin has observed,
consumer assent to Internet-based adhesion contracts is even more fictional than with
the traditional paper versions.56 And, as marketing models grow more sophisticated
and intrusive,57 they threaten even that tenuous grasp on control. Consequently, the
classical model of “contract-as-assent” arguably should be replaced with a new
model of “contract-as-product” in which the terms of a transaction are treated merely
as one more characteristic of the good or service being sold.58 As products or
general existing contract doctrines are adequate protections for consumers contracting on the
Internet).
55
See Jane K. Winn, Contracting Spyware by Contract, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345,
1349-54 (2005) (analyzing problems of consumer assent in relation to purported “agreements”
to place malicious spyware programs upon the consumer’s hard drive); Juliet M. Moringiello,
Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1307, 1319-33 (2005)
(describing process of Internet contracting and reviewing judicial decisions analyzing
problems of assent associated with click-wrap and browse-wrap agreements); Margaret Jane
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in
Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1311-13 (1998) (noting that Internet regulation
through private orderings – rather than through public regulation – is problematic where those
most responsible for private ordering – domain registries, sysops, and content creators – often
have power to force terms on consumers through threat of exclusion); see also Eisenberg,
supra note 7, at 240-41 (noting preoccupation of contract scholars with enforceability of
standard form contract terms); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic
Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971) (addressing assent problems
in standard form contracts generally and noting “But the overwhelming proportion of standard
forms are not democratic because they are not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of the
consumer or business recipient to whom they are delivered”).
56

See Radin, Binding Commitment, supra note 8, at 1155-60.

57

One looming marketing intrusion, for example, is the question of whether marketers can
broadcast ad content to nearby cell phone video screens. See Matt Richtel, Marketers Want to
Appear on the Small Screen, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2006, at C1.
Marketers said they were particularly excited about the prospect of eventually using
cellphones, many of which are equipped with global positioning systems, to send ads
to consumers based on their location. With that information, marketers could, in
theory, send pitches from retailers to cellphone users who might be in the vicinity of a
store.
Id.
58

See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of the Internet, 44 B.C. L.
REV. 433, 441-42, 446-52 (2003) [hereinafter Madison, Rights of Access] (noting problems
raised by “contract-as-assent metaphor” in context of shrinkwrap and click-wrap Internet
licensing agreements); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 275, 315-16 (2003) (arguing that apparent consumer assent to software licensing
terms only represents acquiescence to industry custom and consumers have no real choice if
they want to “acquire use of needed computer software”); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note
13, at 429-31 (surveying arguments suggesting that existing contract rules, including
protections for consumer assent are inadequate); Radin, Online Standardization, supra note
21, at 1139-40 (suggesting that lack of real consent to contract terms in online transactions
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commodities, such contract terms are thus subject to greater state regulatory control,
just as the state already regulates product characteristics such as safety standards,
warranties, and labeling.59
III. BARGAINING POWER AND CONSENT AS BOUNDARIES AROUND THE SELF
Although the debates over propertization and ownership of personal information
on the one hand, and the validity of consumer assent to browse-wrap and click-wrap
terms on the other are interesting in their own right,60 these phenomena are also
important for what they say about bargaining power in the information age.
A. The Nature of Bargaining Power
Bargaining power represents the ability of a party to achieve a preferred outcome
in an exchange relationship.61 Although courts and commentators often tend to think
of contract terms and the bargaining outcome as identical,62 it is important to
may eventually erode the lay conception of contracts as negotiated or dickered agreements);
John J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
285, 286-88 & 308-10 (2000) (asserting that classical assent-based model of contract does not
hold in standard form contract context and arguing for legislatively imposed contract terms to
govern such relations); see also Korobkin, supra note 7, at 1203-07 (describing generally
problems with consumer assent in adhesion contract context); Todd Rakoff, Contracts of
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-80 (1983) (same).
59
This complaint, of course, is not unique to the information age. See, e.g., Arthur Allen
Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 149-50 (1970).
First of all, [regulation of contracts as things] would open up the law’s long tradition,
accelerating of late, of direct, explicit governmental control of the quality and safety or
[sic] products. Autos now have mandatory seatbelts, milk is bereft of its tubercles,
and outright poisonous substances are barred from the marketplace. Even less reified
‘things,’ when seen as products, have been regulated as to quality for a long time. Life
insurance contracts, for instance, have been in effect written by deputy insurance
commisioners for years.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 1139
(“The prevalent economic view of contract has broken down the distinction between
agreement, . . . formerly thought of as a functional object or a collection of functional
features.”).
60

A full analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.

61

See LARRY A. DIMATTEO, ROBERT A. PRENTICE, BLAKE D. MORANT & DANIEL D.
BARNHIZER, VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY, BARGAINING, AND
INTERPRETATION (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 9, on file with authors) (an earlier version
of this piece is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=578578)
[hereinafter BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY] (“A party has bargaining
power if she has the ability to effect intelligently a preferred outcome in a bargaining
relationship.”); cf. Roger Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27 AM.
BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 149, 150 (1983) (defining “negotiating power” as the ability to affect
favorably another party’s decision).
62
Many courts, for example, have concluded that the use of adhesion contracts alone
indicates an inequality of bargaining power. See, e.g., Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341
F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2003) (“A contract of adhesion is one which is prepared by the party
with excessive bargaining power who presents it to the other party for signature on a take-itor-leave-it basis.”); Pardee Const. Co. v. Super. Ct., 123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288, 292-95 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (treating adhesive contract as evidence of inequality of bargaining power); Lytle v.
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recognize that terms alone – even machine-imposed, adhesive, click-wrap, browsewrap, or paper form contract terms – represent only one facet of the parties’ power
relationship.63 The consumer-producer bargaining power relationship also manifests
through other indicia such as price, the “fit” between the good or service and the
consumer’s needs, and the continuing, post-contract, post-fulfillment relationship.
Thus, a consumer that pays through the nose for extremely favorable contract
terms may obtain a worse outcome than one who gets a great price with lousy terms.
Similarly, a consumer who can identify a good or service with a near-perfect “fit”
may in fact be better off than one who obtains a less-suitable product at a lower price
or on better terms.64 Moreover, as producers have matured into information era
business practices, many have started focusing more upon developing long-term
customer relationships that necessarily depend upon both delivering a positive
shopping experience at the front end65 and maintaining a positive reputation and
relationship after the sale has supposedly completed.66 Each of these developments
Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (defining adhesion contract
as form contract to be signed by the weaker party). Even outside of the strictly adhesive
contract context, Professor Korobkin suggests that the ability to set the default terms from
which the parties’ bargaining proceeds still provides the drafter with a bargaining advantage
because the opposing party’s psychological bias for inaction imbues those default terms with
“inertia” or “stickiness.” Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotiation:
The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583, 1586
(1998) (“A bargaining party can gain a strategic advantage by establishing a set of favorable
contract terms as the reference point for negotiations.”).
63
As Professor Ian MacNeil observes, contract terms often may be a relatively unimportant
element in how the parties structure their relationship. See Ian R. MacNeil, Restatement
(Second) of Contracts and Presentation, 60 VA. L. REV. 589, 595-96 (1974) (noting
importance of party relationship in generating expectations of performance and that “most
actual exchanges are at least partly relational”).
64

See Kohli et al., supra note 25, at 120.

65

See Paula Klein, Measuring E-Customer Satisfaction, OPTIMIZE, July 2005, at 30
(reporting close correlation between consumer satisfaction with website shopping experience
and online purchases); Zhenhui Jiang & Izak Benbasat, Virtual Product Experience: Effects of
Visual and Functional Control of Products on Perceived Diagnosticity and Flow in Electronic
Shopping, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 21 no. 3, Winter 2005, at 111, 114-18, 131 (analyzing of
whether tools that permit consumers to engage in virtual manipulation or operation of products
improves online shopping experience and increases likelihood of purchase); see also Stephen
L. Vargo & Robert F. Lusch, Evolving to a New Dominant Logic for Marketing, 68 J.
MARKETING. 1, 2 (2004) (“[M]arketing has moved from a goods-dominant view, in which
tangible output and discrete transactions were central, to a service-dominant view, in which
intangibility, exchange processes, and relationships are central.”).
66

See Khawa A. Saeed et al., The Relationship of E-Commerce Competence to Customer
Value and Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 22 no. 1,
Summer 2005, at 223, 226-27 (“Superior presale and postsale service rendered by the seller
can substantially add to the benefits received and also reduce the buyer’s nonmonetary cost
such as time, effort and mental stress.”); Kohli et al., supra note 25, at 116-17 (discussing
importance of producer assistance in customer decision making process to promote customer
retention). This transition to a customer service and retention marketing strategy is likely an
economic necessity since producers cannot continue the excessive and unsustainable customer
acquisition practices of the late dot-com era. See Pandya, supra note 25, at 70-72 (noting that
1999 customer acquisition costs averaged between $800-$1100 per customer but customer
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increases the ability of the consumer to achieve a preferred outcome despite a
complete lack of control over the terms of the producer’s adhesive, click-wrap
contract.
I have argued elsewhere that bargaining power is an infinitely complex and
dynamic phenomenon.67 The complexity of bargaining power arises from the fact
that almost any quality, characteristic or external event can create conditions that
allow a bargaining party to influence the transaction to achieve a preferred
outcome.68 Moreover, bargaining power comprises multiple forms,69 and courts
generally lack the institutional competence necessary to perceive the real power
relationship between the parties.70 Consequently, while bargaining power appears
throughout contract law,71 courts have generally approached the phenomenon in a
bipolar fashion. A party either has bargaining power or it doesn’t, an on-off switch
that determines in an incredibly sloppy fashion whether the apparently weaker party

spending averaged only about $400 per customer, suggesting importance of producer focus on
maintaining customer satisfaction).
67

For a detailed examination of the nature of bargaining power generally and judicial
responses to bargaining power as a legal phenomenon, see generally Barnhizer, supra note 20.
For a discussion of the role of bargaining power in defining the boundaries of core contract
doctrine and the proper scope of state regulation of exchanges, see generally BARNHIZER,
BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61. The following section summarizes
many points explored in greater detail with those two articles.
68

See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 166-72.

69

See id. at 172-76. Specifically, most instances of power fall within three dichotomous
characteristics: Power may be visible or hidden, real or false, exercised or unexercised. See id.
Visible power is that which is open and known to both sides, while hidden power includes
sources of power known to only one of the parties that would be ineffective if revealed. The
real versus false dichotomy captures the fact that power depends upon perception, and that
deception and falsehood often provide a crucial factor in achieving preferred bargaining
outcomes. Finally, power may be exercised or unexercised – that one of the parties had the
ability to change the outcome of a bargain does not mean that the party will choose to do so or
even know she has that ability. See id. (discussing in detail the matrix created by these
dichotomies and its usefulness for drawing attention to non-obvious sources and forms of
power in analyzing party relationships).
70

See id. at 199-223 (analyzing general failure of judicial attempts to identify and assess
bargaining power disparities in individual cases).
71
Contract law includes doctrines that purport to assign legal consequences to bargaining
power disparities between the parties both as an explicit element and implicitly. For example,
courts often treat a disparity of bargaining power as an explicit element in unconscionability
and public policy determinations. See, e.g., Wille v. Sw. Belle Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 906-07
(Kan. 1976) (identifying various bargaining power disparities as elements of unconscionability
analysis); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003); cf. National
Labor Relations Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 151 (congressional findings that federal regulation
of relations between organized labor and management is necessary because of social and
economic disruptions caused by inequality of bargaining power). Implicitly, bargaining power
analyses appear to influence the outcomes of apparently unrelated doctrines such as parol
evidence rule determinations, principles of contract interpretation and analyses of
consideration. See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 149.
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will gain access to a host of contract doctrines that work to the detriment of the
apparently stronger party.72
Outside of the indeterminacy and incoherence of bargaining power doctrines at
the level of individual cases, our fuzzy conception of this phenomenon also causes
problems at a macroscopic level of analysis. Specifically, despite this legal
indeterminacy, bargaining power is a real phenomenon that induces practical
consequences in real-world interactions between bargaining parties.
Gross
disparities of bargaining power threaten the legitimacy of contract as an institution
premised upon voluntary interactions of the bargaining parties.73
Contract law directly and indirectly polices power asymmetries through internal
doctrines such as unconscionability, fraud, duress, the parol evidence rule and
consideration.74 Courts and legislatures also regulate bargaining power relationships
on a macroscopic level by moving interactions marked by systemically flawed power
relations along a continuum between private autonomy and public ordering.75
Where the bargaining power relationship between transacting parties is “legally
cognizable”—that is where courts and legislatures can consistently and credibly
identify and assign legal consequences to a perceived power relationship—great
disparities may justify moving the parties’ relation along this continuum away from
“core contract” doctrines76 to other regimes such as labor or criminal law.77
72

Thus, in Lloyd’s Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, 1975 Q.B. 326, 339 (C.A. 1974), the English jurist,
Lord Denning, observed that inequality of bargaining power underlies many contract defenses,
including duress, undue influence and unconscionability and suggested policing bargaining
power disparities directly. See also Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An
Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 265, 344-46 (1999) (analyzing Lord Denning’s theory of inequality of bargaining power
on equitable grounds). Bargaining power also informs judicial analysis in the context of
interpretation. See, e.g., First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Purolator Sec., Inc., 388 N.E.2d 17, 21-22 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (bargaining power disparities affect judicial interpretation of contract terms);
Ferguson v. Lakeland Mut. Ins. Co., 596 A.2d 883, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same); Smith v.
Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 440-42 (Cal. 1975) (applying reasonable expectations
doctrine to interpret ambiguities in insurance contract against insurer in light of insured’s
reasonable expectations); cf. Karl Llewellyn, The Effect of Legal Institutions Upon Economics,
15 AM. ECON. REV. 665, 673 (1925) (describing contra proferentum interpretation doctrine as
judicial device to correct information disparities about the meaning of the terms of an adhesion
contract). Similarly, courts may vary application of the parol evidence rule depending on the
parties’ power relationship. See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of
Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7, 24 (1972) (noting empirical evidence suggests that courts
do not apply parol evidence rule rigorously where parties suffer asymmetrical bargaining
power).
73
See SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 23-24 (“A lack of bargaining power in one or both parties
is a reason for limiting their freedom of contract, their contracting power, or both.”).
74

See supra note 71-72 and sources cited therein.

75

See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61, at 59-61.

76
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-45 (2003) (noting that no one theory can explain the
enforceability and non-enforceability of promises across all of what is called “contract law”
and instead developing a positive and normative theory of a core of contract law based upon
transactions between business firms); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113
YALE L.J. 1417, 1465 (2004) (“I argue that contracts involving individuals properly occupy
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Thus, for example, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 explicitly
recognizes that relations between management and organized labor suffered from
systemic bargaining power disparities that threatened interstate commerce.78
Similarly, the fact that both parties in a charitable subscription transaction can be
described as possessing bargaining power justifies actions by courts and legislatures
in some jurisdictions to move charitable subscriptions from the regimes of gift and
property to a contract model in which such subscriptions are enforceable.79 In
contrast, the bargaining power relation between parties making donative promises in
the intrafamily context are typically tainted by messy and complicated power
relations between family members that are not subject to easy unraveling, and
consequently such promises are often treated as outside of contract law and
unenforceable.80
One problem with this theory of bargaining power as defining the scope and
extent of contract law is that, as discussed above, courts and legislatures analyze and
account for bargaining power on only the crudest and most simplistic level.81 This is
primarily a consequence of the fact that the inputs to the power relationship – both in
general and with respect to bargaining specifically – are generally impossible to
measure, assess, isolate, or identify outside of a laboratory context.82
In identifying the legally cognizable power relations that can move a transaction
closer to and further from core contract doctrines, however, legal decision makers do
the center of our intuitive conception of contract, and I identify costs of allowing contracts that
involve organizations to be governed by a legal regime that departs from the collaborative
ideals that I am developing.”); cf. STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 8-9 (2004)
(asserting that scope of legal relations and doctrines comprising “contract” are determined by
a generally accepted consensus of scholars and legal decision makers).
77

See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61, at 68 (“This
continuum of contract and contractlike transactions comprises a wide array of state
interactions, ranging from unenforceable donative promises, to the relatively private “core”contract arrangements between businesses in the pluralist theory envisioned by Schwartz and
Scott, through judicial interventions such as good faith and unconscionability, state-mandated
substantive terms such as warranties and interest-rate caps, state-mandated bargaining
procedures, state definitions of property rights, and on to wholly noncontract regimes such as
criminal law.”).
78

29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935) (citing "inequality of bargaining power between employees who
do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers" as
justification for federal regulation of labor-management relations); see also Kevin M. Teeven,
Decline of Freedom of Contract Since the Emergence of the Modern Business Corporation, 37
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 131 (1992) (suggesting that state “sought to cure inequalities in
contractual bargaining positions in such areas as antitrust, insurance, labor law, transport and
banking”).
79

See BARNHIZER, BARGAINING POWER AS CONTRACT THEORY, supra note 61, at 90 - 91.

80

See id. at 85-91 (comparing donative promises in intrafamily and charitable
subscriptions contexts).
81

See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 199-201.

82

See Robert A. Dahl, The Concept of Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A READER IN THEORY
RESEARCH 79 (1969) (concluding that the study of power as a discrete phenomenon is “a
bottomless swamp”).
AND
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not need to be completely accurate. So long as those determinations are consistently
repeatable and credible to other participants in and observers of the legal system,
they continue to justify and support legislative regimes that regulate certain
transaction types within contract and move others further away. Thus, while an
insured may occasionally have superior bargaining power over an insurer,83
practically everyone accepts the proposition that insurers systemically possess
superior bargaining power in their dealings with insureds.84 This consistent and
credible statement of the power relationship justifies moving the policing of
insurance contracts further from core contract doctrines through state insurance
regulation of insurers,85 special rules of contract interpretation,86 and other noncontract doctrines.
But that explanation works only while the legal description of the power relation
bears some relation to the reality it purports to regulate. For instance, early
twentieth-century descriptions of power relations between firms and individuals with
respect to employment contracts involved free individuals and free employers, both
capable of protecting their own interests in dealing with the other.87 These
descriptions justified policing those bargains under the strong freedom of contract
regime represented by cases such as Lochner v. New York88 and Adair v. United
States.89 More and more, as the industrial age progressed, as employers grew in size
83

See, e.g., Fisher v. Crescent Ins. Co., 33 F. 544, 545 (W.D.N.C. 1887) (“In cases of
contracts for insurance the parties are not, in all respects, on equal footing, as the applicant for
insurance has a better knowledge of the subject matter of the contract than the insurer . . . .”).
84

See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 259 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789, 796 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989); David v. Oakland Home Ins. Co., 39 P. 443, 444 (Wash. 1895) (“[T]he insured
and insurer . . . do not stand upon an equal footing. The insurer is always represented by
persons of experience in such matters, while the insured is usually a man of much less general
information . . . .”).
85
See, e.g., Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 374 (1921)
(noting that state regulation governs all aspects of insurance contracts other than “whether
they will insure or not, with whom they will insure, and for how much”).
86

See supra note 72 and sources cited therein (discussing, inter alia, reasonable
expectations and contra proferentum doctrines).
87
See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1917) (coal
mine owner free to refuse to employ miners who were also members of union and miners were
similarly free to accept such terms or seek work elsewhere); Ocean Accident & Guarantee
Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 257 P. 644, 645 (Ariz. 1927) (noting that under laissez faire
and strong freedom of contract theories “it was gravely insisted by bench, bar, and the leaders
of society that the individual working man, without money, friends, or influence, must be
‘protected in his right to contract freely with his employer . . . .’”).
88

198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (holding that state has no power to interfere with employment
contract between employee and employer by attempting to set hours and working conditions
because such regulations interfere with parties’ constitutional liberty interest in freedom of
contract), overruled on other grounds by Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421
(1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
89
208 U.S. 161, 175 (1908) (“[T]he employer and employee have equality of right, and
any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract
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and market power, as individual workers perceived themselves to have lost whatever
bargaining power they had in the pre-industrial era, the equal bargaining power
claims of the Lochner regime no longer seemed to fit the actual experiences of labor
market participants.90
Similar to the fundamental changes in social, economic, political and cultural
patterns that accompanied industrialization, the information age also challenges our
underlying notions of power relationships between contracting parties. Although the
real impacts of these changes are still speculative, it can be argued that many of the
industrial era protections for consumer transactions that are premised upon
stereotyped caricatures of consumer/producer relations no longer make sense.
Contract doctrines such as unconscionability, for example, depend in part upon clear
divisions between powerful producers and weak consumers. Likewise, much
consumer protection legislation depends upon the informational and other power
disparities between producers and consumers. As the real power relations
underlying these pre-information era legal regimes change, it is unlikely that the
crude contract law models of bargaining power can continue to provide credible
explanations for state regulation of some classes of consumer contracts.
B. Development of a Property Metaphor for Bargaining Power, Consent and the
Self
The propertization metaphor offers a compelling alternative to the crude contract
conception of bargaining power as an all-or-nothing affair. Many commentators
have argued that the propertization of personal information and the commodification
of contract in the information era justify additional regulation of consumer
transactions.91 While both questions are interesting in their own light, they
which no government can legally justify in a free land.”), overruled on other grounds by
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
90

See, e.g., Pound, supra note 19, at 454-56 (noting problems with assumption of strong
freedom of contract regime that all parties had equal power to protect their interests in light of
great perceived power disparities between large scale employers and individual employees);
Isaacs, supra note 7, at 47 (noting that for many bargainers disenfranchised by business and
employment practices of the early twentieth century, “freedom of contract has become a mere
mockery”); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 156-57 (1930) (Anchor Books ed.
1963) (noting cases upholding regulation of working conditions as an example of initial step in
“abandoning ‘medievalism’ when [judges] begin to procure, and to rely on, carefully prepared
factual data as to the social setting of the cases which come before them for decision”); Karl
N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract? -- An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 751 (1931)
(“Overwhelming is the realization of how far a law still built in the ideology of Adam Smith
has been meshed into the new order of mass-production, mass relationships.”); cf. Harold J.
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105, 140-44 (1917) (suggesting that
formalistic employment doctrines such as the fellow-servant rule should be abandoned in light
of changes in the employment relationship and working conditions wrought by advent of
industrial age).
91

See Solove, supra note 12, at 1396 (“The more that is known about an individual, the
easier it is to force his obedience. Through the use of databanks, the state and private
organizations can transform themselves into omnipotent parents and the rest of society into
helpless children.”); Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 275, 322-25 (2003) (noting that wealthy can opt out of oppressive private contractual
licensing regimes and critiquing consumer acquiescence as one cause of current oppressive
practices in software licensing contracts); Katyal, supra note 6, at 290-316 (arguing that
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potentially offer much more in the context of the overall bargaining power relation
between consumers and producers in the information age.
Both phenomena impact the ability of consumers to affect the outcome of their
interactions with producers. Producers already possess a significant bargaining
power advantage over consumers through superior information regarding the product
being sold and the value of the terms contained in their contracts.92 But while access
to information and the ability to set the default terms of the parties’ bargain are
usually important aspects of bargaining power,93 they are not determinative. Instead,
the commodification and/or propertization of these sources or components of
bargaining power illustrates the deeper truth that the information age, with its
defining characteristics of cheaper access to information, communications,

privacy invasions by private entities, such as demands for data on consumer downloading
activities and unauthorized remote searches of consumer hard drives to monitor violations of
intellectual property rights, are oppressive and should be more closely regulated); Hillman &
Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 429-31 (surveying articles suggesting existing contract rules,
including protections for consumer assent, are inadequate); cf. Radin, Online Standardization,
supra note 21, at 1139 (suggesting that Internet-based contracting may lead laypersons to
reconceptualize their understandings of contract in favor of regulation under contract-asproduct model).
92
See SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 26-31. As Professor Slawson succinctly notes, while
consumers must investigate characteristics and qualities of thousands of different products in
myriad combinations, a producer “only needs to understand the products he produces.” Id. at
26. Moreover, surrogates for direct investigation by the consumer, such as relying upon a
producer’s reputation or reports by third party investigators cannot solve the informational
disparity because both measures provide only incomplete information about the particular
product being purchased, if the consumer relies upon these sources at all. See id. at 27.
Likewise, legislative attempts to improve consumer power, such as consumer protection laws,
do not significantly affect the power dynamic because most products today – from loans to
automobiles – are highly complex with many attributes that producers can manipulate to make
consumer understanding or comparisons difficult. See id. at 28-29. And finally, the nearuniversal application of standard-form contracts to all consumer transactions “enables the
producer to take maximum advantage of his superior understanding of the product and the
law.” Id. at 30.
93

See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES 97-101 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasizing
importance of developing information about each party’s Best Alternative To Negotiated
Agreement (“BATNA”)); RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 11-13
(2002) (emphasizing importance of information development and protection to the negotiation
process); H. Lee Hetherington, The Wizard and Dorothy, Patton and Rommel: Negotiation
Parables in Fiction and Fact, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 289, 311-15 (2001) (noting, inter alia,
importance of information as source of bargaining strength); cf. HENRY S. KRAMER, GAME SET
MATCH: WINNING THE NEGOTIATIONS GAME 98 (2001) (noting that “[d]ata collection and
analysis is a key to negotiation success” and “[a]lthough good data can never in itself
substitute for negotiation power, correct information will greatly facilitate your ability to
wring from a negotiation the most advantageous outcome reasonably attainable”); STEVEN J.
BRAMS, NEGOTIATION GAMES: APPLYING GAME THEORY TO BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION
227 (2d ed. 2003) (noting potential for information about other party’s preferences to disrupt
bargaining power).
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information processing,94 and incentives for customization, specialization and
standardization95 has created the conditions for reconceptualizing bargaining power
and the consent power as either property rights in themselves or as boundaries that
define, control, and protect from invasion the fundamental property interest in the
self.
1. Invasions of Self in Information Era Consumer Contracting
With the constant onslaught of targeted marketing and commercial invasion of
our personal privacy, the individual self is under attack, and individuals’ ability to
control that self grows more elusive. While rationally we might easily decide that
the emergence of new powers and conditions allowed by the Internet and
information technology is only a natural linear extension of the past and therefore a
matter of degree, it is also possible that these new capabilities represent a change in
kind distinct from historical conditions on which contract doctrines are grounded.
After all, a nuclear bomb is still a bomb, but no one thinks of it in the same way as a
stick of dynamite. The general category “bomb” is the same but entirely different
rules apply to all phases of deployment, storage, transport and use. Similarly, preinformation age producers gathered and used their customers’ personal information
to increase sales and used adhesion contracts to control their risk exposure, but the
invasion, collection, processing and use of private information and the active use of
that information to attack the individual’s ability to withhold consent is so
unprecedented that it can only be described as a different kind of interaction than the
quaint standard form paper contracts of yesteryear.
Before the information era, producers did generate consumer profiles based upon
information gleaned from their interactions with those consumers.96 But the
informational inputs for those models were incomplete compared to what can be
gathered and processed today, and much of the data lacked the fluidity that
characterizes today’s models.97 While such incomplete profiles could provide

94
See Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra note 27, at 2060-73
(describing methods of data collection, processing and commodification of personal
information).
95

See Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 1144-46 (noting that online
contracting environment makes possible new kinds of customization such as manufacturing
goods to order or customization of terms, but also fosters standardization of contract terms to
facilitate increased use of machine-made contracts).
96

See TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 8:
The offline activity [collection of consumer data and using that data for targeted
marketing to consumers] has actually been going on for quite a while. As early as the
1980s, financial and leisure firms as well as elite retailers were following the logic of
developing relationships with customers based upon digital repositories and their
treating them differently based on what they learned. They created the databases by
soliciting information from their customers, buying information about their lifestyles
from data brokers, and tracking their interactions with them.
97

See Schwartz, Data Processing, supra note 3, at 1325-39 (noting that historically,
information profiles of individuals were incomplete and that “[t]he computer changes personal
information into a fluid form, which allows it to be applied at many stages of administrative
decisionmaking”).
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commercial benefits by allowing producers to track their best-valued customers, the
limitations of the paper medium and the costs associated with maintaining such
profiles and reacting to them would restrict the types of customers and transactions
in which they would be most commercially exploitable.98
In contrast, information era producers and data miners can use data harvested
from nearly every interaction between consumers and providers of goods, services,
charities, and political and social organizations to produce a “finely-grained”99
electronic copy or doppelganger of individual consumers.100 Producers create and
purchase this data solely for the purpose of building these electronic doppelgangers
of individual consumers to tell the producer what cues and stimuli will create a
desired response in consumers.101 In a very real sense, the doppelgangers provide
producers with proxies for the individual’s self. In the right combinations the
doppelgangers may merely doom us to the boredom of fulfilled expectations. My
doppelganger on Amazon.com, for instance, has led me to exceed my margin of
diminishing returns in several sub-genres of science fiction.102
98

Cf. TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 8 (noting that early commercial use of consumer
profiles was restricted to high-value transactions such as financial, leisure and “elite” retailing
firms).
99

Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 29, at 1620 (“As a result of cyberspace
code, surfing and other cyberspace behavior generate finely granulated data about an
individual’s activities – often without her permission or even knowledge.”).
100
See Sovern, supra note 22, at 1034-43, 1045-47 (detailing amount of information
collected from individuals, use of information to create individual consumer profiles, and
commercial use of profiles to increase sales); Katyal, supra note 6, at 241-44 (noting that
careless consumers now transfer and sell personal information to third parties “often without
the individual’s knowledge”).
101

See Katyal, supra note 6, at 241-44. And although a full discussion of the issue is
beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to note that information and communications
technology in many ways has increased our control over how our selves and identities
manifest to the outside world. First, by lowering search and information costs, the Internet
and similar technologies assist consumers in identifying and acquiring those products that best
fit the self image they wish to project and assist producers in identifying formerly
unexploitable niche markets and exploiting them. Thus, as Professor Julian Velasco suggested
in response to an early workshop presentation of this paper, the Internet makes it possible for a
manufacturer of leg lamps to identify and market to the geographically dispersed group of
oddball consumers who would purchase such products. The availability of such unique goods
in turn helps the oddballs better express their inner selves through the purchase and display of
lamp icons generally deemed unacceptable in polite society. Second, “[o]n the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog.” Peter Steiner, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, July 5, 1993, at 61. The
general anonymity and separation of person from identity allowed by information culture
allows participants to craft their own preferred identity, whether it be a hip and sexy swinger
at the other end of a particularly witty text message, a political firebrand on a discussion forum
or blog, or an umpteenth-level battle-mage in popular massive multi-user roleplaying
adventure games like Everquest.
102

Interestingly, the doppelgangers may produce at the margins a feedback effect between
the consumer and her electronic profile. Take Amazon.com’s recommendation list, which
appears to be based partly on their own algorithms and upon the behavior of other consumers
who purchase or review the same products. When I make a purchase, for example, of Robert
A. Heinlein’s “Starship Troopers,” Amazon.com logs that purchase in my profile and suggests
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In other combinations, however, the doppelganger is manipulative and vaguely
evil – it tells producers whether and how much to serve me as a customer,103 who I
am and how to get me to jump when the producer pushes the right buttons.104 For
instance, as I learned with the births of my two daughters and resulting deluge of
junk mail, pop up ads, spam, and targeted banner ads, producers who know a
consumer’s income, address, local school choices, and family status can prey upon a
new parent’s insecurities regarding the future and significantly increase the chances
of selling increased life insurance, homeschooling materials, private school options,
college savings accounts and purported child-safety devices for the home.105 While
many of these offers were interesting, some were so invasive and blatantly
manipulative that I actively fantasize about where Dante would have placed
marketers of childrens’ educational products.
2. Inadequacy of Contract-Based Power Models in Information Era Consumer
Contracting
In the information era context, the crude bargaining power models used by
contract law cannot explain the rich and detailed texture of the real power
relationship between consumers and producers. In contract, courts often determine
the parties’ bargaining power relationship and then justify that determination by
piling on one or more categories of situations or classes that typically suffer
bargaining power weakness. Thus, in Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont
other books based upon that profile and upon purchases by other consumers who also bought
that book. Importantly, though, my doppelganger is not a perfect match for my tastes. It will
tend to make some recommendations that match well – i.e., Joe Haldeman’s “The Forever
War” – and some that lie outside the margins of my current preferences – i.e., Ursula K.
LeQuinn’s “The Left Hand of Darkness.” By actively marketing LeGuinn’s novel, however,
Amazon.com increases the chances that I will read it and potentially develop a new taste for
that sub-genre. To the extent my tastes represent my self, Amazon.com’s doppelganger will, in
effect, have changed my preferences and thus, to a slight extent, developed my personality or
self in direction it would not have gone absent the doppelganger’s influence.
103

See Anthony Danna et al., All that Glitters is not Gold: Digging Beneath the Surface of
Data Mining, 40 J. BUS. ETHICS 373, 373-74 (2002) (noting uses of sophisticated data mining
and analysis software to identify high-value customers with whom the producer should
develop a relationship management strategy to retain the customer and to offer different
content and service than that provided to low-value customers); Saeed et al., supra note 66, at
228 (noting that organizations can use technology to “personalize, augment, or even transform
the services they provide to customers”).
104

In a more dangerous example of the potential for harm raised by the availability of such
detailed pictures of ourselves, the Chicago Police Department has recently warned its
undercover officers that dozens of data mining services can provide any interested buyer with
detailed records of their cell phone activity. See Main, supra note 43 (noting “[c]riminals can
use such records to expose a government informant who regularly calls a law enforcement
official” or an undercover officer who uses an undercover cell phone to call “personal
numbers such as home or the office”).
105
See also Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640, 643-53 (N.J. 1971) (condemning as
unconscionable and deceptive trade practice door-to-door educational book sellers’ practice of
targeting low-income, limited education consumers living in primarily minority
neighborhoods for high-pressure sales efforts to sell educational materials at 2.5 times actual
retail value).
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Gravel, Inc.,106 the court determined that a buyer of manufacturing equipment lacked
bargaining power because the negotiations occurred over 45 minutes, the contract
was signed in a parking lot and the buyer later stated he “felt he had a gun to his
head.”107 Similarly, in Pardee Construction Co. v. Superior Court,108 the court
explicitly excluded evidence that first-time homebuyers might have had meaningful
alternatives to purchasing a home from the defendant’s development project.109 And
in the other direction, as Professors Larry Garvin and Blake Morant have observed,
small businesses typically are denied access to doctrines based upon bargaining
power asymmetries merely because they are presumed to be sufficiently
sophisticated to avoid the impacts of such disparities.110
This crude model of bargaining power as an inherent quality or characteristic of
the parties may have been necessary in the industrial and post-industrial periods. An
individual grunt laborer attempting to contract with a large producer probably does
lack bargaining power in negotiating for employment terms.111 The employer has a
functionally unlimited supply of workers, while the employee must sell his labor at

106

412 N.W.2d 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).

107

Id. at 720-23.

108

123 Cal. Rptr. 2d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

109

See id. at 294.

110

See Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 297 (2005) (“In their dealings with consumers, small businesses
must give protections based on asymmetries that may not exist. In their dealings with larger
businesses, small businesses are treated as though the parties are essentially equal, which will
not usually be true save in the most formal sense.”); Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains
in an Age of Contractual Formalism: Strategic Initiatives for Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 233, 244-46 (2003) (reporting results of empirical survey showing that
small businesses often face substantial challenges to viability, including lack of bargaining
power).
111

The contemporary controversies surrounding employment of day laborers in many
cities, for instance, is at least partly concerned with the hiring and “negotiation” process in
which prospective day laborers – who are often illegal immigrants – congregate at a common
hiring site and are hired on a job-by-job basis. See, e.g., Nathan Thornburgh, Inside America’s
Secret Workforce, TIME, Feb. 6, 2006, at 39 (describing hiring of day laborers and noting that
influx of illegal workers is driving down wages even for more established illegal immigrants);
David Cho, $400,000 to Aid Day Laborers, WASH. POST, May 12, 2005, at T03 (noting that
many day laborers are illegal immigrants, problems associated with laborers congretating at
hiring sites such as business parking lots, and problems experienced by day laborers including
lack of breaks and shorted pay from employers). But see P.S. ATYIAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 339 (1979) (noting that increased bargaining power of trade unions
was not the cause of rise in wages from early- to later-industrial era).
The reason why the wage of the worker of (say) 1850 was only a fraction of his wage
today is because the national product in 1850 was only a fraction of the national
product today. The difference made by the shift in the relative bargaining power of
employers and workmen only affects the additional, relatively small proportion of the
wage which the employer can pay without bankrupting himself on the one hand, and
the worker can forgo without serious loss to himself on the other hand.
Id.
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some price or starve.112 Similarly, it may have been enough for Judge Skelly Wright
that Mrs. Williams of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.113 fame was a poor,
unsophisticated black woman on welfare to justify his suggestion that she lacked
bargaining power and could not understand the meaning of the add-on security
clause at issue in that case.114
In the “bad old days” before widespread use of the Internet and other information
technologies, consumers had high information costs, little time to shop, few sources
from which to shop, and a relatively narrow selection of mass produced,
standardized products and contract terms from which to choose. The process
involved significant costs, including time spent obtaining information about a
product or terms, scheduling requirements, and the cost and time of transport to
different sites at which the desired products could be found. Any efforts that a
consumer made at improving his or her bargaining position versus an individual
seller were generally expensive, could affect only limited aspects of the deal, and the
benefits were uncertain. In purchasing an automobile, for example, a consumer
might stop by the local library or subscribe to magazines such as Consumer Reports,
might search the newspapers for sales and discounts, might get word-of-mouth
references from other consumers (who were likely as ignorant as she was) about
various products and sellers. In other words, that consumer might spend days
seeking out low-quality bargaining power inputs.
The cost of these bargaining power improvements was high and the benefits
could not clearly be measured. Moreover, it was impossible to determine the value
of each incremental investment in developing additional bargaining power.115
112

See, e.g., James Gray Pope, Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to
Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1071, 1106-07 (1987) (“[U]nlike producers of other
perishable commodities, workers cannot save costs in an unfavorable market by ceasing
production. . . . The worker cannot cease to maintain her labor power without starving her
body.”); Matthew S. Bewig, Lochner v. The Journeymen Bakers of New York: The
Journeymen Bakers, Their Hours of Labor, and the Constitution, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 413,
414 (1994) (“The fact is that the working man has only his labor to sell, and he must sell it in
order to purchase the necessities of life for himself and his family.”); cf. RICHARD C.
OVERTON, PERKINS/BUDD: RAILWAY STATESMEN OF THE BURLINGTON 5-6 (1982) (relating
1870s business opinions of Charles E. Perkins, then vice-president of the CB&Q Railroad, that
“[i]f one man can by frugality get along on fifty cents a day, and will work for that, another
man who requires a dollar is not entitled to have it”). But see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense
of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 975-76 (1984) (arguing that employees often
do possess substantial bargaining power in dealing with employers).
113

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

114

See id. at 449-50 (suggesting that plaintiffs lacked bargaining power but remanding for
futher findings). But see Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability do to
the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625, 652-54 (2002) (containing a
historical investigation suggesting that local residents who dealt with Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co. were aware of the practical effects of defaulting on credit payments, regardless
of whether they actually understood the specific contract terms).
115

Cf. Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath: Dealing with
Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 8-14 (2000) (“Power is not
precisely quantifiable because it is complex – arising from numerous factors and their
interrelationships both within the individual and the relationship ('social context') of the
individual with the opponent – and based upon a nearly purely subjective analysis of those

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/6

26

2006]

PROPERTIZATION METAPHORS FOR BARGAINING POWER

95

Visiting one more dealership, doing one more hour of research, bringing a friend to
the bargaining session—all of these actions theoretically could increase the
bargaining power of a car shopper. But given the variations between transactions
and the high costs of collecting and organizing information on different transactions,
whether any given investment in bargaining power could potentially yield greater
benefits than costs was impossible to determine. Similarly, variations between
shoppers—in wealth, demeanor, bargaining skill, experience, knowledge, gender,
and stubbornness—could also significantly impact the shopping process.116
Even the most assiduous bargainer in that context could likely do little to
improve her bargaining position, regardless of additional time, education,
information search, and other costs incurred. Moreover, even if Mrs. Williams—or
any pre-information era consumer, for that matter—had taken specific steps to
improve her bargaining position, the effects of those steps could not be measured
because her interaction with Walker-Thomas Furniture would be unique compared to
any other consumer. Under these conditions, legal decision makers had no real
choice in adopting a rough-and-ready conception of bargaining power because a
more complex and more nuanced model could not yield superior results.117
3. Developing an Information Era Model of Bargaining Power
The information era, in contrast to the paper contracting paradigm, offers a much
more interesting picture of bargaining power. Consumers and producers in the
information era possess many options for improving bargaining power, options that
are discrete, identifiable, low-cost, and—thanks to advances in data collection and
processing, communication and standardization—carry measurable benefits.
Information era bargaining power inputs are, in essence, commodities that can be
identified, priced, bought, sold and owned by producers and consumers. This does
not mean, however, that consumers or even producers can adequately measure the
value of every specific bargaining power input.118 Rather, with reduced information

factors.”). As Adler & Silverstein note, power is based largely upon perceptions and without
an actual contest the parties are only guessing about each other's actual bargaining power. See
id. at 14.
116

During my post-high-school employment at a small auto dealership a few miles outside
the relatively wealthy community of Chagrin Falls, OH, for example, I observed first-hand
substantial differences in the way the sales staff approached bargaining with young car buyers
from inside town versus local buyers. One sales person actually told me that they explicitly
steered the buyers from town to sporty cars and rarely lowered the price significantly, whereas
local buyers tended to bargain harder for cheaper, more practical cars. Similarly, Professor
Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever report that women generally negotiate less for similar
products than men, and consequently end up paying significantly more for the same good or
service. See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON’T ASK:
NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003).
117

Of course, courts and legislatures always had the option of doing away with specific
bargaining power-based standards altogether. See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 193 & n.223
and accompanying text (suggesting that legal conception of bargaining power “has proved so
slippery and indefinable, so vague and nebulous, and so open to uncertainty that its utility for
explaining any element of the bargaining relationship is doubtful”).
118
See infra notes Part IV.C and accompanying text (noting that despite information
collection and processing tools it is still likely impossible to accurately assess power in
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and transaction costs, markets can now provide additional products and services that
increase or reduce consumer and producer bargaining power.119
Thus, information tools lower costs associated with search, information
acquisition and evaluation, and other transaction costs for many different consumer
individual cases and arguing that contract law should abandon inequality of bargaining power
as relevant consideration in such cases).
119

These bargaining power inputs may be positive - increasing a party’s ability to control
the outcome of the bargain – or negative – decreasing the other party’s power. On the positive
side, consumers, for example, have access to nearly unlimited information about producers,
their products, their prices and their reputations. See supra notes 121-130 and accompanying
text (surveying informational tools available to consumers in e-commerce). Consumers also
can easily access inexpensive brokers for a wide range of products, have lower search costs to
identify products that satisfy their needs and desires, and can educate themselves regarding the
meaning of contract terms, bargaining and shopping tactics, and their legal or extra-legal
options in the event of a dispute. See AllBusiness.com, What Are Boilerplate Provisions in
Contracts?, http://www.allbusiness.com/articles/Contracts/789-1551-1777.html (last visited
Mar. 4, 2006) (describing purposes and uses of boilerplate clauses and providing links for
defining boilerplate contract terms); May Wong, Consumer Reports: Shopping Online
Smarter, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://www.livescience.com/
technolgy/ap_051104_shop_online.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) (providing advice on
effective online search, shopping and purchasing).
On the negative side, consumers can take some steps to decrease producer bargaining
power, such as installing protective software that prevents most types of covert online data
mining and using Internet browsers with robust privacy protections. See, e.g., Ad-Aware
Personal, http://www.lavasoftusa.com/software/adaware/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (“AdAware Personal provides advanced protection from known data-mining, aggressive
advertising, Trojans, dialers, malware, browser hijackers, and tracking components.”). The
Mozilla Foundation’s open-source Firefox web browser, for example, provides strong privacy
protections with the base program, including easily accessible features that permit users to
exercise substantial control over typical invasions such as pop-up advertisements, cookie
downloads and an easy means of deleting all clickstream data from the user’s hard drive. See
Firefox 1.5, http://www.mozilla.com/firefox/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (reviewing security
and privacy features of Firefox web browser); see also Allen Fear & Richard Vamosi, CNET
Review of Firefox 1.5, http://reviews.cnet.com/Firefox_1_5/4505-9241_7-315164112.html?tag=nav (last visited Feb. 23, 2006) (reviewing features of open-source Firefox web
browser program, including security enhancements). Other programs permit consumers to bar
all incoming email, cookies, javascript programs, and other privacy invasions except for those
coming from trusted “whitelisted” sources, i.e., a list of trusted sources that are always
permitted to operate upon the user’s computer or interface.
See Wickipedia,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitelist (last visited May 7, 2006). Finally, the truly paranoid
can access a wide array of free- and pay-site Internet browsing anonymizers that will prevent
data miners from grabbing any meaningful clickstream data, disposable email addresses, and
remailers. See How Anonymizers Work, http://www.livinginternet.com/i/is_anon_work.html
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (“An anonymizer protects all of your computer's identifying
information while it surfs for you” by routing the individual web surfer’s clickstream through
a separate computer or network, thereby placing a virtual wall between third-parties and the
individual’s clickstream data); Heinz Tschabitshtcher, Top 10 Disposable Email Address
Services, http://email.about.com/cs/dispaddrrevs/tp/disposable.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2005)
(describing disposable email services that permit consumers to provide producers with valid
email addresses that can be deleted if used to send spam and providing links to popular sites);
Living Internet, Remailers, http//www.livinginternet.com/i/is_remailers.htm (last visited Feb.
25, 2006) (“A remailer enables you to send and receive email while keeping your real email
address secret, by retransmitting your email with an anonymous return address.”).
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transaction types to near zero.120 The cost of performing an Internet price
comparison search for most products is de minimus, but often yields significant price
advantages.121 Similarly, information technology lowers the cost of identifying
suitable products and salient product features, as well as research on negotiation
tactics,122 the meaning and legal effect of boilerplate contract terms,123 and easy
access to legal representation if the deal goes sour.124 Consumers unskilled at

120
See Michael R. Galbreth et al., A Game-Theoretic Model of E-Marketplace
Participation Growth, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 22 no. 1, Summer 2005, at 295, 298 (“given
the possibility of a high level of buyer and seller participation, electronic markets can enable
nearly perfect competition”); Cenk Kocas, Evolution of Prices in Electronic Markets Under
Diffusion of Price-Comparison Shopping, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 19 no. 3, Winter 2003, at
99, 100 (noting that Internet creates potential for efficient markets, although that potential has
not yet been fully realized); Amy E. Cortese, Good-bye to Fixed Pricing?, BUS. WK., May 4,
1998, at 71-72 (projecting that Internet and information technology will reduce menu costs –
the costs that producers incur to adjust their prices – and interaction costs so much that
competitive bidding will become the norm for purchasing goods and services).
121

See Pandya, supra note 25, at 70 (“[I]nstead of clicking across multiple sites, 80% to
90% of buyers of books and CDs visited only one site, even though prices of books and CDs
across Web sites varied by as much as 25% to 30%.”); see also TUROW ET AL., supra note 44,
at 7-8 (noting overall lack of consumer sophistication regarding Internet pricing practices, data
collection, and fraudulent schemes).
122
See, e.g., Kelly Blue Book, http://www.kbb.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2006) (providing
links to articles providing advice on researching, financing, negotiating and purchasing new
and used automobiles); Edmunds.com, http://www.edmunds.com/advice/ (last visited Jan. 20,
2006) (same). Intriguingly, Edmunds.com also provides an extensive advice section relating
specifically to women that identifies the existence of a gender gap in dealership treatment of
car buyers and advises women about avoiding common discriminatory tactics. See
Edmunds.com, The Women and Family Car Guide, http://www.edmunds.com/women/index.
html (last visited Jan. 20, 2006); cf. BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 116, at 115-16
(noting that women “are willing to pay as much as $1,353 to avoid negotiating the price of a
car, compared to half as much, $666, for men”).
123

See, e.g., Curt M. Langley & Jason T. Martin, Boilerplate Terms, Rules of
Interpretation, and Developments in Drafting Contracts, http://images.jw.com/com/
publications/204.pdf (last visited May 7, 2006) (explicitly identifying and explaining
numerous types of boilerplate terms); Jordan Schrader P.C., Don’t Get Burned By the
Boilerplate, http://www.jordanschrader.com/articles/article0062.html (last visited May 7,
2006) (discussing legal effect of boilerplate terms and surveying reasonable expectations
doctrine); Allbusiness.com, Top 10 Contract Drafting Mistakes, http://smallbusiness.yahoo.
com/r-article-a-1401-m-1-sc-11-top_ten_contract_drafting_mistakes-i (last visited May 7,
2006) (listing boilerplate terms of particular importance to contract drafters in small business
context).
124

A Google search on February 18, 2006 for “Legal Services,” for example, produced
1.25 billion hits, with the top three commercial links leading to Prepaid Legal Services, Inc.
and two attorney referral services, Legal Connection and Legal Match. See Pre-Paid Legal
Services, Inc., http://www.prepaidlegal.com (offering a variety of legal services plans with
varying levels of consultation and representation for about $25 per month, depending upon
jurisdiction); LegalMatch, http://www.legalmatch.com (lawyer referral service); Legal
Connection, http://www.legalconnection.com (lawyer referral service).
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negotiation can obtain free advice or locate negotiation training,125 acquire the
services of agents or brokers for many different types of transactions,126 including
insurance, automobiles, homes and employment, and – more importantly – check
agent reputations and the results delivered by the agents.127
In other contexts, the ability of the parties to improve their own or diminish their
opponent’s bargaining power is less clear. The relative détente in terms of
information between consumers and producers means that consumers in the United
States128 have lost the battle for control over their private information,129 but
125

The Internet is replete with free content advising consumers on shopping and
negotiation strategies and tactics. See, e.g., May Wong, Consumer Reports: Shopping Online
Smarter, http://www.livescience.com/technology/ap_051104_shop_online.html (last visited
Feb. 20, 2006) (providing search, information gathering, and shopping strategies and tactics);
Kelley Robinson, 5 Ways to Negotiate More Effectively, http://sbinfocanada.about.com/cs/
marketing/a/negotiationkr.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (providing strategies and tactics for
improving negotiation skills). At least one negotiation services firm – The Negotiation Skills
Company, Inc. – provides a discussion forum in which forum participants can submit specific
questions regarding negotiation tactics and strategies to a specialist and review and search past
answers dealing with a wide array of situations. See The Negotiation Skills Company, Inc.,
Questions from our Website Visitors and Answers from TNSC, http://www.negotiationskills.
com/qa.php (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
126

See, e.g., Mike Hudson, Using a Car Broker to Buy Your Next Vehicle, http://www.
edmunds.com/advice/buying/articles/103283/article.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006) (offering
advice on hiring and using a broker for automobile purchases); see also Ken Shaw, Hiring an
Auto Broker Rarely Saves You Money; It's Like Two People Trying to Share a Meal that's
Meant for One Some in the Business Double-Dip, Collecting Fee From Client, Dealer,
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 30, 2005, at G12 (arguing that automobile brokers are unlikely to deliver
significant savings to clients given auto manufacturer and dealer movements toward highervolume/lower-margin sales strategies).
127

See Hudson, supra note 126 (“But like any deal, it's important to do a little research on
the broker before you jump headlong into their arms, drawn by promises of lower prices and
advocacy for your needs.”).
128

The European Union purports to take a much more protective attitude toward
propertization of personal information through its Data Privacy Directive. See, e.g., Julia M.
Fromholz, The European Data Privacy Directive, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 461, 466-69 (2000)
(surveying Data Privacy Directive protections against collection of personal information).
129

Theoretically, it is possible to maintain some control over personal information. A
substantial portion of American adults, for example, choose to remain offline for various
reasons, including lack of interest, lack of time, fear or lack of understanding of technology,
fear of fraud, pornography, and lack of access. See SUSANNAH FOX, THE PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, DIGITAL DIVISIONS 2-4 (2005); AMANDA LENHART ET AL., THE PEW
INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE EVER-SHIFTING INTERNET POPULATION 10-13
(2003). Market forces, as well as general pique with Microsoft over its perceived reputation
for privacy and security protections, have driven the development of technological privacy
protections such as the Firefox browser, Privacy Protection Protocols (P3P), adblockers,
Internet browsing anonymizers, remailers, and encryption. On the other hand, in researching
this paper, I attempted to install a robust suite of such privacy tools. After much investigation,
downloading, installing, tweaking, cursing, and more tweaking, my Internet browsing has
slowed to a crawl, and I am still often forced to rely upon the Internet Explorer browser to
view important legal research databases and .pdf files.
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producers have likewise lost or given up substantial control over their pricing
information130 and online reputations.131 And, as the e-commerce format matures,
producers are shifting from a customer acquisition model of marketing and service to
a customer retention model.132 Under the latter model, producers increasingly
compete on the basis of customer service and improving or maintaining customer
relationships, rather than on price.133
On the producer side of the scale, it is important to note that such dramatically
expanded access to information is not a panacea to consumer bargaining power
deficiencies.134 Consumers still cannot negotiate or shop contract terms beyond a
130

See F. GERARD ADAMS, THE E-BUSINESS REVOLUTION & THE NEW ECONOMY 140-42
(2004) (noting significant cost savings in B2C and B2B e-commerce contexts over paper
contexts, as well as substantial unmeasured gains resulting from convenience and greater
access to information).
131

As one example of this lack of producers’ control over their online reputations,
consumers have developed many “corporate complaint” websites designed to spread
information about negative experiences the consumers have suffered with particular
businesses. Because such sites are as readily available to consumers as the producer’s own
site, they may have a significant impact on some firms. See Ronald F. Lopez, Corporate
Strategies for Addressing Internet “Complaint” Sites, Aug. 1999, http://www.construction
weblinks.com/Resources/Industry_Reports__Newsletters/August_1999/august_1999.html
(last visited Feb. 13, 2006) (noting stories of two businesses – EPS Technologies and Express
Success, Inc. – that apparently suffered significant lost revenues as a result of poor responses
to corporate complaint sites). Courts have generally rejected firms’ attempts to shut down
such negative websites. See Lucas Nursery and Landscaping, Inc. v. Grosse, 359 F.3d 806,
810 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that a noncommercial consumer complaint site does not violate
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), where consumer operated
site solely to complain of producer’s service and did not register domain name to sell to
business); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 439-40 (5th Cir. 2004) (same); Bally Total
Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F.Supp. 2d 1161, 1162 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (rejecting claims
of trademark infringement, trademark dilution and unfair competition against consumer who
operated website titled “Bally’s Sucks”). But see Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d
672, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that a noncommercial consumer complaint site that uses
firm’s mark in domain name may violate Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1125(d), if cybersquatter registered domain name with “bad faith intent to profit”).
132

See supra notes 63 - 66 and accompanying text.

133

See, e.g., Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 469-70 (suggesting that Internet
producers are particularly sensitive to maintaining their online reputations and may thus avoid
enforcing onerous contract terms); Report Shows Top Online Retailers Are Leaving Money on
the Table; Improvements in Online Customer Satisfaction Could Improve Bottom Line, BUS.
WIRE, June 1, 2005 (“In many cases, companies that are competing primarily on . . . price are
competing on the wrong thing. Our study shows that price matters some of the time but key
aspects of the site experience matters (sic) 100 percent of the time – literally 100 percent.”).
134
Professor Slawson has expressed substantial skepticism about the ability of consumer
product information providers to affect significantly the producer’s substantial advantage over
the consumer in information and bargaining power. See SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 27 (noting
that while Consumer Reports and other special interest magazines can slightly reduce the
producer advantage, the usefulness of such reports is limited by both the consumer’s ability to
understand the information presented, the consumer’s limited attention span, and the fact that
it is impossible to investigate more than a small fraction of the total purchases made by
consumers).
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few salient product characteristics such as price, the color of the good, or the length
of the insurance term. Moreover, at least some producers appear to be responding to
price transparency and low menu costs by either hiding their prices135 or by offering
different prices to different buyers based upon characteristics such as buyer loyalty
or buyer sophistication.136 Similarly, many providers have incentives to vary the

135

For example, I have noticed that some of the larger web retailers such as Amazon.com
have started withholding prices of some sale items unless I put those items in my online
shopping cart. Theoretically, this practice could prevent competitors from employing web
search programs to survey Amazon.com’s prices on various items. Cf. Patricia L. Bellia,
Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2176-78 (2004) (surveying cases
involving property-based claims by e-commerce producers against third parties who used
software robots to extract producer pricing information for commercial use). Amazon.com’s
explanation for this practice suggests that they are attempting to prevent third parties from
undercutting their prices:
The "click for price" message indicates an additional discount is in effect, and this
discount is calculated in the Shopping Cart. You can see this price by clicking the
product name and then selecting the Add to Cart button on the product information
page. Please be assured that simply adding an item to your cart does not obligate you
to buy it--you can always delete the item from your cart if you decide not to purchase
it.
Amazon.com, Why Don’t We Show the Price?, http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/
feature/-/174014/002-9516208-0776028 (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). An equally plausible,
albeit more cynical, explanation is that a consumer is more likely to purchase something that is
already in his online shopping cart than something that can be evaluated and ignored without
taking any steps toward commitment. Cf. Melissa Carpanelli, Combatting Shopping Cart
Abandonment, Entrepreneur.com, available at http://www.aol.entrepreneur.com/aolsb/article
/0,4558,318313,00.html (last visited May 7, 2006) (noting econsumers abandon approximately
half of online shopping carts).
136

See Anita Ramasastry, Web Sites Change Prices Based on Customers' Habits,
CNN.com, June 24, 2005, http://ucg.net/2005/LAW/06/24/ramasastry.website.prices/index.
html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006) (noting Internet “enables businesses to collect detailed
information about a customer's purchasing history, preferences, and financial resources – and
to set prices accordingly”); Paul Krugman, Reckoning; What Price Fairness? N. Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 2000, at A35 (opining that price discrimination (or ‘dynamic pricing’), while unfair,
may actually be good for the economy because the practice efficiently segments markets);
Joseph P. Bailey, Internet Price Discrimination: Self-Regulation, Public Policy, and Global
Electronic Commerce, May 1, 1998, at 3-4, http://www.tprc.org/abstracts98/bailey.pdf (noting
that reduced menu costs in e-commerce context promote ability of producers to engage in
price discrimination, but that “in many cases, consumers can develop a strategy to counteract
price discrimination”). As Turow et al. note, “[P]rice discrimination is a logical corollary to
behavioral targeting.” TUROW ET AL., supra note 44, at 10. In addition to offline environments
in which producers such as financial institutions, department stores and supermarkets profile
customers and offer differentiated service to high- and low-value customers, e-commerce
provides a unique dynamic pricing opportunity for producers:
Merchants consider the online environment a particularly ripe area for such “dynamic
pricing” -- that is, for first-degree price discrimination driven by behavioral targeting.
Writing in Harvard Business Review, associates from McKinsey & Company chided
online companies that they are missing out on a “big opportunity” if they are not
tracking customers' behavior and adjusting prices accordingly. Consultants urge
retailers to tread carefully, though, so as not to alienate customers.
Id. (citations omitted).
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quality of their informational offerings in order to better segment their markets.137
And the jury is still out on whether increased competition and information on
contract terms will force producers to adopt efficient terms in their online or offline
adhesion contracts.138
The bottom line for this contest is that both consumers and producers have a
wider, more robust, and more clearly defined array of bargaining power tools
available than at any time in the past. But more important than potentially
heightened consumer power, the costs of many bargaining inputs have diminished
and the benefits are sufficiently identifiable that investments in additional bargaining
power inputs now make sense in many more contexts than in pre-information era
consumer contracting. In other words, the significance of information era bargaining
power tools is not just that there are more potential ways to improve consumer
bargaining power, but also that consumers are better able to take advantage of those
tools over a wider variety of transactions.
IV. BARGAINING POWER AND THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A PROPERTIZATION
METAPHOR
The contract law model of bargaining power cannot account for these drastically
varied and dynamic changes to the bargaining power relationship between consumer
and producer. In contrast, the commodification and propertization of personal
information and producer contract rights provide a useful metaphor for

137
See Frederick J. Riggins, Market Segmentation and Information Development Costs in a
Two-Tiered Fee-Based and Sponsorship-Based Web Site, J. MGMT. INFO. SYS., vol. 19 no. 3,
Winter 2003, at 69, 73-74 (noting that while information dissemination and distribution on
Internet is essentially costless regardless of quantity of information disseminated, many
providers of information goods on the Internet have incentives to offer low-quality
information goods to low-end consumers and superior-quality information goods to high-end
consumers willing to pay). Thus, many content providers maintain Web sites with two tiers of
content – free low-quality content and high-quality content available for a subscription or fee.
138
Professors Hillman and Rachlinski, for example, note that in the paper and online
contracting paradigms “[t]he ability of businesses to identify efficient allocation of risks
[through contract terms] also gives them the opportunity to exploit consumers by getting them
to accept terms that inefficiently shift risks to consumers.” Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note
13, at 440 (citing Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269-73, 1275 (1993)
(“[T]he law has given drafters of form contracts the power to impose their will on
unsuspecting and vulnerable individuals.”)). Theoretically, competitive pressures should force
reputation-sensitive producers with inefficient contract terms to adjust those terms in response
to market demands, even if only a small portion of potential customers are savvy enough to
demand such terms. See id. at 442-44 (also noting situations in which producers would not
have incentives to provide efficient contract terms, including lack of sufficient number of
savvy consumers, lack of concern over reputation, and producers’ ignorance of their own
contract terms). The online business environment – where disgruntled e-consumers can
quickly communicate their beefs with particular producers to all other interested e-consumers
– potentially ameliorate producers’ ability to impose inefficient terms or at least their
willingness to enforce particularly harsh terms. See id. at 469-74. But see Korobkin, supra
note 7, at 1217-44 (arguing that producers have strong incentives, in light of boundedly
rational nature of consumers, to offer low-quality, non-salient contract terms and other product
attributes and compete only on nearly universally salient product characteristics such as price).
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reconceptualizing how to account for and react to bargaining power between
contracting parties. First off, let me make clear that in analogizing the consent
power or bargaining power to property rights, I am not talking about a return to
Lochnerian ideals of a substantive due process right or a property right in freedom of
contract.139 Nor am I addressing whether consent should be protected under a regime
of property or liability rules.140
Rather, I am intrigued by the idea of property as a means of protecting the
individual against claims of the state and of other private entities. As Professor
Radin notes, the creation or elimination of property rights in any subject matter has
profound policy implications not just for the “thing” being propertized, but also
within surrounding legal “neighborhoods” such as “contractual ordering,
competition, and freedom of expression.”141 For Radin, propertization refers to a
dynamic process by which a society debates and defines which tangible or intangible
things should be subject to control by property owners and how much control those
owners should have in relation to the rights of other members of society.142 The
information propertization phenomenon is the process by which the state and society
recognize property rights in information, data collections, and creative works and
determine how much control the “owners” of these newly-created property interests
should have over that information.143 In that context, Radin makes a key observation
that the policy debate over whether and how much to propertize such information
“should take account of information propertization’s legal milieu” to maintain
coherent “doctrinal, policy, and practical boundaries . . . [and] achieve sound
economic and social policy as expressed and implemented through the law as a
whole.”144
139

See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (finding statute that prohibited
termination of employee for membership in labor union unconstitutional as “illegal invasion of
the personal liberty as well as the right of property of the defendendant, Adair”) overruled on
other grounds by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
140

See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U .CHI. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1993) (distinguishing between unconscionability
as a property rule that prohibits enforcement of any part of contract obtained improperly and
as a liability rule that prohibits only enforcement of unreasonable terms).
141

Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and its Legal Milieu,
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006).
142
See id. at 23-24. Radin identifies five characteristics of the “investigation of whether
something is or ought to be property or a property right.” First, property is controlled by
society. Second, propertization (and by implication “depropertization”) is a dynamic process
whereby things move in and out of a property regime. Third, “becoming property is a
process,” and, fourth, a thing involved in that process may move anywhere along a continuum
of greater or lesser property rights. Finally, the lines between property and not-property are
subject to debate. See id.
143

See id. at 25-26.

144

Id. at 27; see also Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstruction of Property: Property as
a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 363 (2002) (“[I]f courts and legislatures
treat idea-expression, identity-expression, and information-expression as property, they should
consider the range of interests in the objects of this intellectual property, particularly interests
in using such objects for free expression of political, educational, and cultural speech. Property
is a web of interests, not a unitary entitlement.”).
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While Radin’s observations are important for the suggestion that intellectual
property law must account for doctrine and policy in surrounding regimes like
contract, competition law, and free speech, it is also true that the surrounding legal
regimes can benefit from improved heuristics drawn from the propertization
metaphor. This is particularly true with conceptions of bargaining power in contract
law, which traditionally have underdeveloped notions of the real power relations
between bargaining parties and relied instead upon stylized, formalistic, and static
legal responses to perceived power imbalances.145
In contrast to the equal/unequal power dichotomy typically found in judicial
contract law analyses, property speaks directly to discrete interests subject to the
control of the property owner and to the owner’s right to exclude others from
invading that interest.146 The meaning or core idea of private property itself is
uncertain,147 ranging from nothing more than a temporary and revocable license
granted by the state and subject to change at any time148 to a strong or near-absolute
dominion by a private person over things, land, ideas, and information.149 But at its
145

See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 213-16 (surveying judicial use of status characteristics
in bargaining power analyses); see also Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 556-57 (1967) (noting courts “seem
continually to have taken a kind of sub rosa judicial notice of the amount of power of certain
classes of people to take care of themselves, often without too much inquiry into the actual
individual bargaining situation.”).
146

See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45
ARIZ. L. REV. 372, 377-390 (2003) (surveying theories of property and characterizing “the
right to exclude [as] part of the unified set of rights that constitute the concept of property that
is defined and protected by our legal institutions”).
147

See LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 4
(2003) (“We seem, in fact, to have multiple conceptions of the power of property in law –
some of which strongly protect individual interests, in the way that rights are traditionally
understood, and some of which do not.”). Given that I am interested in property and
propertization solely for metaphorical purposes in developing a reconception of bargaining
power in the consumer context, this Article is purposefully agnostic regarding the debate over
the true nature and justification of property and property rights.
148
See Kevin Gray & Susan Francis Gray, The Idea of Property in Land, in LAND LAW:
THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 41-43 (Susan Bright & John Dewar, eds. 1998) (“[T]he concept of
property in land may well denote no more than a temporarily licensed form of utility or user
privilege which may be extended, varied, or withdrawn at the sole discretion of the state and
on terms dictated by it.”); Daniel W. Bromley, Private Property and the Public Interest: Land
in the American Idea, in LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST: PRIVATE CLAIMS AND THE COMMON
GOOD 29 (William G. Robbins & James C. Foster eds. 2000) (“Land rights are granted by the
polity because of the larger social benefits that arise therefrom. . . . But that grant of
ownership, that consent, must always be predicated upon the larger social good.”); see also
UNDERKUFFLER, supra note 147, at 3 n.9 (quoting Gray & Gray, supra, as one extreme in
range of possible theories of property rights).
149
See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697 (1999) (“Courts seem to be replacing the traditional rationale for
trademark law with a conception of trademarks as property rights, in which trademark
‘owners’ are given strong rights over the marks without much regard for the social costs of
such rights.”); Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX.
L. REV. 873, 895-904 (1997) (observing trend in favor of treating information and intellectual
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heart, the idea of property concerns control and exclusion.150 Property rights are
those rights that permit an individual to secure and control his relationship with the
claimed property to the exclusion of others.
This metaphor incorporates well into the analysis of bargaining power. At its
core, bargaining power represents the ability of a party to achieve a preferred
outcome in an exchange transaction. In exercising bargaining power, a party asserts
a species of control or dominion over his self, expressing preferences for one bargain
or set of terms over another. Thus, at this level, bargaining power establishes one set
of boundaries by which a bargaining party controls or owns his self in the bargaining
context.151 At another level, individual inputs to bargaining power may be described
as being propertized. For example, information is often noted as a key element of
bargaining power. The information economy represents the current pinnacle of a
process of developing vast quantities of information into collections that can be
manipulated, processed, and divided into discrete units that markets can evaluate and
offer for sale to producers and consumers alike. As information becomes propertized
and “ownable” in the information economy, that component of bargaining power
likewise becomes more and more like property.152
By viewing bargaining power in terms of discrete, property-like inputs supplied
by the market that consumers can evaluate and invest in to improve their position
and in turn protect their ability to control manifestations of their selves through
contract, the propertization metaphor creates the potential for developing a more
realistic mechanism for evaluating the parties’ relative power. As discussed below,
however, this improved heuristic for assessing relative power ironically may destroy
the inequality of bargaining power doctrine as a legally meaningful device for
judicial evaluation of individual cases. The value of the propertization heuristic
instead lies on the more general level of legislative action in which both courts and
property as strong or absolute property rights and concluding that propertization of intellectual
property law is “a very bad idea”); cf. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, supra
note 27, at 2058 (defining property as “any interest in an object, whether tangible or
intangible, that is enforceable against the world”).
150

See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV.
347, 354 (1967) (“Private ownership implies that the community recognizes the right of the
owner to exclude others from exercising the owner's private rights.”); LAWRENCE C. BECKER,
PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 18-23 (1970) (“[O]wnership typically has
something to do with the right to use, the right to transfer, and the right to exclude others from
the thing owned”); David D. Haddock & Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 545, 558-61 (2002) (noting that while private property rights imply
that “use by one individual precludes simultaneous use by another,” few property interests are
purely open or purely private); cf. Mossoff, supra note 146, at 377-92 (observing that the right
to exclude is an essential, but not sufficient, characteristic of property and is a corollary of the
substantive possessory rights of acquisition, use and disposal).
151

Cf. Katyal, supra note 6, at 233 (“[I]n real space, property rights, coupled with
architecture serve as a defensive shield to protect privacy.”).
152
While information is the easiest example of a bargaining power input that is in the
process of propertization, other facets of negotiation strength are also subject to this process.
For example, another common indicator of bargaining power – the availability of meaningful
alternatives – is the implicit foundation of many Internet-based goods and services, such as
price comparison websites, online travel agencies, and Internet auction sites.
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legislatures determine which transaction types should be regulated according to
“core” common law contract doctrines and which suffer from such systemic
disparities of bargaining power as to require state intervention to protect weaker
parties against exploitation.
A. Propertization as an Improved Heuristic for Assessing Power Relationships
Property’s foundation in discrete boundaries upon the rights of individuals
potentially provides a much more detailed depiction of bargaining power in the
information age than the on/off dichotomy of contract law. The contract model for
assessing bargaining power looks primarily to limitations on a party’s bargaining
power. Did the parties lack meaningful alternatives? Was one of the parties
operating under necessity? Did the parties fit within the traditionally weak or strong
status classifications such as poverty, gender, age, education, business sophistication
and so on?153 Once the court satisfies that determination – one way or the other – the
inquiry stops.154
This contract-based view of bargaining power phenomena may make sense in a
pre-information era context in which the noise created by high information costs and
wide variations between transactions obscures the availability, effects, and benefits
of actions that could possibly increase or decrease bargaining power. Under this
view, bargaining power is not a means for protecting consent or control of the self, it
is just a medium, like air, in which interactions take place. We may know when it is
present or absent, and we can occasionally sense movements in that medium, but we
generally do not attempt to discern its component parts or track its impact upon other
objects. As a consequence, it makes little sense to ask what parties could have done
to improve their bargaining power or to protect their ability to withhold consent
because post hoc judicial assessments of any particular course of action will be
purely speculative.155
Post-information era advances in information and communications technology,
however, mean that parties (and possibly courts and legislatures) can now identify
153

See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 200-01 (“Typical characteristics of individual parties
relied upon by courts to support an inference of inequality of bargaining power include wealth,
business sophistication, education or knowledge, race, gender, "size" of the parties, monopoly
power, and consumer status. And as a final alternative, many courts eschew standards for
assessing inequality of bargaining power, relying instead upon a "we-know-it-when-we-see-it"
approach.); see also supra notes 115-117 and accompanying text (noting traditional bargaining
power inputs).
154

See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (noting bipolar fashion in which courts
approach bargaining power analyses).
155
Notably, however, courts have occasionally suggested that parties could – and should –
have taken alternative courses to improve their bargaining position. See, e.g., Deminsky v.
Arlington Plastics Machinery, 638 N.W.2d 331, 342-43 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
provision requiring purchaser of plastic manufacturing machinery indemnify seller for seller’s
negligence or product defects was not unconscionable, in part because purchaser could always
have chosen to buy machinery elsewhere or to forego acquiring machinery entirely); Ryan v.
Dan’s Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 403-04 (Utah 1998) (observing that employee
presented with adhesive employment contract including at-will employment clause was not
coerced into signing agreement because employee always had the option of quitting and
seeking work elsewhere).
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discrete bargaining power inputs and, in many cases, make rough value assessments
of those additional inputs in relation to the proposed transaction. More importantly,
we can assess whether a party had any meaningful options for improving his or her
negotiation position and whether the party unreasonably failed to do so. Again using
the automobile shopping context as an example, buyers with Internet access156 can
acquire basic information on the product, the manufacturer, the seller, prices,
warranty options, and other salient characteristics at minimal expense. For about
five dollars, a car buyer can subscribe to Consumer Reports for one month and order
new car price reports that include information on dealer incentives and rebates.157
Twenty to twenty-five dollars will buy a vehicle history report detailing whether the
vehicle has ever been in an accident, flooded, burned, rejected under state lemon
laws, and other major issues.158 For as little as $200, a buyer with little time or
bargaining skill can hire an auto broker to negotiate the purchase for them.159 And
on the back end of the deal, third-party insurers compete for extended warranty
business on both new and used cars.160 While the market values of such services do
not necessarily portray the exact benefits a consumer will receive in terms of
increased bargaining power, the fact that the market offers and identifies a particular
value for such services permits consumers at least to evaluate and make a decision as
to whether to invest in a particular input.
B. Bargaining Power as a Protection of the Property Interest in the Self
Contract concerns manifestations of the self in the objective world through the
exercise of consent. Consent provides an indication of personal identity to the world
as the self manifests its preferences for some types of contracts and not others.161

156

Approximately 22% of American adults claim they have not used the Internet or email
and that they do not have Internet access at home. See SUSANNAH FOX, DIGITAL DIVISIONS 3
(2005). The Pew Internet & American Life Project reports that 32% of these non-Internet
users have no interest in accessing the Internet, while only 31% of the non-users completely
lack access, and smaller minorities of non-users avoid accessing the Internet because “they are
too busy or think going online is a waste of time,” or getting access is difficult, frustrating or
expensive. Id.
157
See ConsumerReports.org, Consumer Reports Bottom Line Price, http://www.consumer
reports.org/cro/cars/the-consumer-reports-bottom-line-price-405.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2006).
158

See Carfax.com, http://www.carfax.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).

159

See, e.g., Mike Hudson, Using a Car Broker to Buy Your Next Vehicle, http://www.
edmunds.com/advice/buying/articles/103283/article.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
160
See, e.g., Carbuyingtips.com, How To Buy An Auto Extended Warranty, http://www.
carbuyingtips.com/warranty.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
161

Importantly, consent is only a subset of the overall class of voluntary actions and
choices that form every individual’s character and project that character to the world.
Professor Jonathan Jacobs, for example, persuasively and elegantly develops the Aristotelian
notion that individuals voluntarily develop their own characters through the exercise of
personal choices and habituation of those choices, and thus bear responsibility for the
manifestations of that character in the world. See JONATHAN JACOBS, CHOOSING CHARACTER
10-33 (2001). Sartre similarly builds on this theme of choice and responsibility as voluntary
manifestations of the self:
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Thus, by consenting to a contract for a particular product—an automobile,
refrigerator, mortgage, or a law school education—an individual consumer adopts
and promotes a particular external picture of the self.162 If external forces impair the
power to grant or withhold consent, such that a party is compelled to enter a
particular contract or eschew another, in a sense that party no longer fully “owns” his
self because he cannot exclusively control how that self operates or manifests to the
world. The property interest in that manifestation of the self has been impaired.
If the consent power is one manifestation of a property interest in self-identity,
bargaining power represents the fence around it. By analogy, a rancher may own
both a parcel of real property and the length of barbed wire and fence posts around
that parcel, but the proper use of one piece of property enhances and defines the
other property. Similarly, bargaining power comprises these separate inputs that
may be property analogs in themselves, but their true value lies in maximizing the
consent power they surround and protect. Thus, for example, an individual may
invest tremendous labor, time, and money in obtaining a business education, or in
developing decision-management software, or in hiring legal counsel to assist in
business negotiations. The individual “owns” those bargaining power inputs, but
they have value primarily as means of protecting the individual’s power to grant or
withhold consent in various transactions and contexts.
Despite the availability of such discrete and identifiable bargaining power inputs,
consumers display wide heterogeneity in the degree to which they take advantage of
readily available tools that will maximize their ability to achieve a preferred outcome
in the transaction. As noted previously, even in situations involving homogenous
commodities such as CDs and books, some, if not most, e-consumers regularly fail to
perform price comparisons or shop at more than one site.163 Others routinely do so.
Such heterogeneity is not surprising. Parties often possess bargaining power that
they fail to exercise.164 They may not be aware that they possess that power, may not
know the results of exercising their power, may be restrained by obligations to third
The most terrible situations of war, the worst tortures do not create a non-human state
of things; there is no non-human situation. . . . [I]n addition the situation is mine
because it is the image of my free choice of myself, and everything which it presents
to me is mine in that this represents me and symbolizes me.
JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 52-59 (Hazel E. Barnes, trans.)
(1957). There are many other opportunities for development and expression of the self—
including consent or choice in the political, social, familial, and religious contexts. But while
action in those contexts—our votes, friendships or enmities, support, and tithes—will
advantage or disadvantage other actors in a relatively restricted and unmeasureable sense, our
choices in the commercial context provide the most tempting targets for manipulation by
everyone else who wants our money.
162

See Allen, supra note 53, at 751-57 (analyzing privacy as necessary context in which
individuals develop moral autonomy necessary to participate through exercise of personal
choices and in response to external obligations in the public sphere and emphasizing need for
morally autonomous individuals to separate actions in public sphere from private sphere).
163

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.

164

See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 171-72 (noting that parties may often possess sources
of power that they do not exercise for various reasons, including ignorance, lack of willpower,
external pressures from other parties, and hopes for maintaining good future relations between
the parties).
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parties, or may merely be unwilling to use that power.165 The important question in
the consumer transaction context asks whether contract law should hold consumers
responsible—by denying them access to protective doctrines such as
unconscionability, undue influence, duress, avoidance for public policy, the parol
evidence rule, the reasonable expectations doctrine, and interpretive rules like contra
proferentum that are based upon bargaining power weaknesses—for their failure to
take reasonable, low-cost steps to improve their bargaining power and protect their
ability to withhold consent. If Mrs. Williams knew that Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co. would repossess all items financed under the add-on security clause, and she
intelligently accepted the risk, should she be barred from claiming unconscionability
under an inequality of bargaining power theory when she defaults on her loan
payments?166 If a single Internet search would have shown this problem, did the
consumer lack bargaining power, or just fail to access a cheap and readily available
source?
Contract law doctrines employing bargaining power do account for the role of
personal responsibility to some extent. The official comment to U.C.C. § 2-302, for
example, explicitly provides that “[t]he principle [of unconscionability] is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power.”167 Reliance upon a misrepresentation or
promise that the party knows to be false or unreliable will generally preclude claims
of fraud or promissory estoppel arising from one party’s monopoly on truthful
information.168 Likewise, although more relevant to questions of assent than issues
165

See id.

166

This question is actually important and intriguing. As Eben Colby observes in a wellresearched and documented historical analysis of the Williams backstory, the community
serviced by Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. was probably generally aware that the company
would repossess all financed items upon any default in payments. See Colby, supra note 114,
at 625 n.1, 652. As Colby notes, even rioters trashing the store in response to the assassination
of Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. specifically called for looters to “Get the books! Get the
books!” See id. at 625 n.1 (quoting William Raspberry, The Day the City’s Fury Was
Unleashed: Lessons of the Riots, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 1988, at A1). Likewise, while Mrs.
Williams “testified that she did not understand the actual contracts . . . . Walker-Thomas
Furniture Company had filed approximately one hundred writs of replevin each year for many
years preceding Williams’s litigation and appears to have acquired a reputation for its
actions.” Id. at 652.
While not sure about Ora Lee Williams in particular, an attorney that has represented
the furniture company is of the opinion that many of the people in the neighborhood,
and many customers of the store, were familiar with the repercussions of not making
timely payments – specifically that the company would repossess all items sold to that
customer.
Id.
167

U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.

168

See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Parham, 693 So.2d 409, 421 (Ala. 1997) (holding party
who was “fully capable of reading and understanding . . . documents, but nonetheless made a
deliberate decision to ignore written contract terms” could not show reasonable reliance
necessary to support claim of fraud); Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674, 676-77 (Mass. 1983)
(rejecting, for lack of reasonable reliance, real property buyer’s claim of fraud against seller
and real estate broker for failure to disclose seasonal water problem on site where buyer had
notice of seasonal water issues and purchased property anyway); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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of bargaining power disparities, court decisions relating to shrink-wrap and clickwrap contracts have shown little sympathy to consumer claims that they were unable
to learn about, read, print and understand the terms of these contracts. In Hill v.
Gateway 2000, Inc.,169 for example, the Seventh Circuit’s affirmation of the
enforceability of “money now—terms later” shrink wrap contracts in effect imposes
responsibility on consumers to take the additional step of returning the purchased
product to the producer in order to protect both their bargaining power and their
power to withhold consent.170
C. Propertization of Bargaining Power at the Judicial Level of Analysis: The End of
the Inequality of Bargaining Power Doctrine
By creating the basis for a wide heterogeneity of individual bargaining power,
information technology has potentially destroyed bargaining power as a legally
meaningful concept in many consumer contexts. Arguably, courts could continue
employing the tired old proxies for negotiating strength—wealth, education,
sophistication, gender, race, and so on—and just add “Internet access and
sophistication” as one more item in the list.171 To the extent that approach deviates at
all from traditional contract models for assessing bargaining strength, it will likely
merely add additional factors to be considered in an already indeterminate and
incoherent inquiry.
The problem with that approach is that the propertization of bargaining power
inputs is not just an exercise in identifying items for the list of attributes that
CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (stating that enforcement of promise under promissory estoppel theory
may depend upon reasonableness of promissee’s reliance).
169

105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).

170

See id. at 1151; see also Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401-402 (2d
Cir. 2004) (observing that user of online domain name registration information is bound by
use restrictions of which it became aware after first request for registration information);
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that shrink wrap
contract in which consumer has opportunity to review terms and reject if unacceptable is
sufficient to create enforceable contract upon use of product); Caspi v. Microsoft Network
LLC, 732 A.2d 528, 125 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1999) (“The plaintiffs in this case were free to scroll
through the various computer screens that presented the terms of their contracts before
clicking their agreement.”); cf. In re RealNetworks, 2000 WL 631341, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
(holding in context of “written agreement” requirement under Federal Arbitration Act that “the
process of printing the License Agreement is no more difficult or esoteric than many other
basic computer functions, and the melodrama and over exaggeration with which Intervenor
describes the alleged impossibility of printing the License Agreement is disingenuous”).
171

Many commentators have worried, for instance, that the “digital divide” will create a
new social class division between those with Internet access and those without. See, e.g.,
Patricia M. Worthy, Racial Minorities and the Quest to Narrow the Digital Divide: Redefining
the Concept of “Universal Service,” 26 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1, 39-48 (2003)
(“[T]oday’s digital environment has evolved to the point that a ‘digital divide’ between
distinct groups of Americans is at risk of becoming a form of ‘information apartheid’ . . .
based on income, . . . race, and geography. . . .”); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Silicon Ceilings:
Information Technology Equity, the Digital Divide and the Gender Gap Among Information
Technology Professionals, 2 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 2, 2-4 (2003) (noting that while
“women use the Internet in greater numbers than men, the number of women who are
information technology professionals . . . lags far behind that of men”).
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typically give rise to power in most relationships. Instead, by looking at bargaining
power as comprising discrete, identifiable, valuable and “ownable” inputs, which in
turn act to fence or guard the individual self’s ability to fend off unwanted
approaches, we move from a gross weighing of crudely-recognized limits on the
individual’s power to the much more interesting question of what an individual could
do to improve her situation. Many of the traditional considerations are relatively
immutable—an individual generally does not quickly become sophisticated,
educated, wealthy or poor, or change races or genders easily.172 But the Internet
changes everything. With low information and transaction costs, the Internet and
accompanying information technology creates the potential for consumers to identify
additional bargaining power inputs and to acquire them cheaply, quickly and easily.
Power, at least in social situations, is generally about the potential, not the actual,
and that is the question that the Internet throws squarely in the face of the contract
model for measuring relative bargaining strength. What if Mrs. Williams had a
friend over when the Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. rep knocked on her door? How
about a competitor’s catalog showing substantially better terms and promising “we
won’t repo your whole house for one missed payment”? A quick reference guide
discussing the pros and cons of add-on security clauses? A lawyer sitting quietly on
the kitchen stool? Each of these possibilities is a hammer blow to her claims of
bargaining weakness and at a certain point we just lose sympathy. Instead, we ask
“what did Mrs. Williams know and when did she know it?”
As power becomes commodified and propertized, discrete and identifiable,
marketable and marketed, the onus should shift to the allegedly weak parties to
justify why they did not take reasonable steps to improve their bargaining position. A
friend of mine recently got a great bargain on his vehicle insurance from an
insurance provider that eventually denied his claim when the vehicle caught fire.
Afterward, he discovered that his Secretary of State’s website prominently listed that
insurer as having engaged in numerous deceptive trade practices and bad faith claim
denials. A simple Google search would have revealed significant problems. While
the insurer may have violated state insurance regulations and potentially committed
fraud or other deceptive trade practices, it seems unreasonable to assert inequality of
bargaining power as a justification for an unconscionability claim in that case
because the insured could have found other providers and could have known the
reputational issues surrounding the “great” price on watercraft insurance.
Tempting as such ideas are from an individual responsibility and strong personal
autonomy point of view, the most likely outcome of these scenarios is not a
refinement of traditional approaches to assessing bargaining power. Instead, in the
context of individual cases, the propertization of bargaining power and consent
power illustrates the absurdity of attempts to impose legal consequences based upon
relative bargaining power.
First, the Internet creates as many power issues as it resolves. The same
technological developments that permit consumers to drive better bargains may also
generate new sources of bargaining power disparities, as with the digital divide
172
Of course, other factors often employed by courts to weigh relative bargaining power
may change quickly, including availability of meaningful alternatives, necessity, and
opportunity to negotiate. See Barnhizer, supra note 20, at 213-15 (analyzing relationship
between individual characteristics such as wealth or sophistication and transactional
characteristics such as availability of meaningful alternatives or necessity).
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phenomenon173 and Seth Godin’s second divide between the digiterati and the
technological herd.174 No matter how many new sources of bargaining power the
information era creates for producers and consumers, there are always additional,
unknown and perhaps unknowable sources of power outside of what we can see, and
those sources will be outcome determinative.
Second, the easy availability of potential sources of power may finally destroy
inequality of bargaining power as a legally meaningful construct in individual cases.
Analogous to Radin’s suggestion that the strongly adhesive nature of Internet-based
contracting may finally change lay perceptions that contracts are worthy of
enforcement because they are “bargained for” or “agreed to,”175 the ability of a
consumer to make reasonable, cheap, and quick improvements in their bargaining
position may erode perceptions of power as a static phenomenon. The availability of
so many reasonable and affordable means for consumers to increase their bargaining
power strongly suggests that if courts insist on assessing the parties’ relative
bargaining power then the parties should be responsible for their decisions not to
make reasonable investments in developing their positions. If it is widely-known
that many consumers improve their bargaining strength, then that potential becomes
at least as important to the analysis of relative strength as the parties’ actual power.
While we may fool ourselves into thinking that we can figure out the actual balance
of power between contracting parties, it seems unlikely that any court could sit
through arguments relating to the potentially infinite array of things the weaker party
could have done to get a better deal.
D. Propertization of Bargaining Power Inputs Informs Legislative-style
Decisionmaking Regarding State Intervention into Private Contracts
On the macro level, treating bargaining power as an analog to property may be
useful for grounding normative judgments that a particular class of transactions
should be moved closer in or further out from “core” contract doctrine.176 The
problem with the bargaining power justification for defining where along the
continuum between pure private autonomy and pure public orderings a particular
transaction type belongs is that those placements are based upon systemic
assessments of the relative bargaining power of the parties. Where those bargaining
power assessments are legally cognizable—that is where legal decision makers can
consistently repeat those assessments across similar transaction types and where

173

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.

174

See Godin, supra note 35 (describing “new” digital divide between technologically
savvy “digiterati” and the rest of us who are merely content to adopt new technologies after
they enter the mainstream).
175

See Radin, Online Standardization, supra note 21, at 1140 (noting that while lay people
tend to “conceive of contract as dickered consent between two people,” an online contracting
environment will erode that conception).
176

See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (using examples of National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 and charitable subscriptions law to illustrate situations in which courts
and legislatures have moved transaction types closer to or further from the “core” of common
law contract).
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observers accept those assessments as credible—they justify decisions on the degree
of regulation appropriate for a particular transaction type.177
Where the initial determinations do not reflect the parties’ actual power
relationship or changing circumstances over time alter traditionally accepted power
assessments, the decision to move the transaction closer in or further from core
contract doctrine becomes insupportable. Thus, while the traditional assessment of
the bargaining power relationship between strong insurers and weak insureds178
likely was correct when made, the information era has undoubtedly increased the
bargaining power of insureds who can now easily compare coverage, prices, claim
denial rates, firm reputation, and sanctions or warnings issued by state regulators,
and in many cases, fine tune their insurance requirements to a greater degree than
was possible in the pre-information era. Admittedly, insureds have never, and likely
never will, have greater bargaining power than insurers,179 but it is also true that the
traditional picture of the completely helpless insurance consumer no longer makes
sense.
Treating bargaining power as comprising a body of discrete potential inputs in
the information era, however, may partly resolve this problem. The property model
of bargaining power creates a more finely-grained picture of bargaining power by
identifying additional discrete sources of bargaining power and the potential value of
additional investments in developing those sources. Traditionally acknowledged
sources of power such as wealth, education, and business sophistication remain
relevant to power assessments, but the availability of additional discrete inputs such
as price and warranty shopping, information on producer reputation and others
necessarily changes the nature of such inquiries. But the bargaining power story of
oppressed consumers makes sense only where the consumers cannot take reasonable
steps to improve their situation. The proper analysis in the information era is not
whether consumers, women, ethnic and racial minorities, the elderly, the poor, the
uneducated, the needy, buyers in monopolized markets, and so on lack bargaining
power or lack meaningful alternatives. Rather, the question should focus on how
much bargaining power they have or could have across different categories of
transaction types. In refocusing the inquiry toward a more dynamic and complex
bargaining power analysis, the propertization model potentially promotes more
accurate (or at least more credible) initial assessments of typical power relationships
and a justification for state responses to changed circumstances.
V. CONCLUSION
The Internet and its accompanying host of information technologies have created
a different kind of power relationship between producers and consumers. Many
aspects of that relationship appear unchanged from traditional models. Producers
still have near-complete superiority in information about their products, still know
their markets, and still generally control the terms of their contracts with consumers.
177

See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (analyzing insurer bargaining power over
insureds in most cases).
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Cf. SLAWSON, supra note 4, at 25 (“[A] producer almost invariably possesses substantial
bargaining power over its own products in an absolute sense. It would not stay in business
long if it did not.”).
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Consumers still fail to read and understand their form contracts, still blithely give
away valuable information and rights, and still cannot bargain in any meaningful
way over their contract terms.
But other aspects of that relationship are radically different. In addition to their
past advantages, producers now possess an Orwellian database of information about
their consumers and can invade their customers’ lives with sophisticated and targeted
marketing designed to increase the likelihood that an individual consumer will
succumb to their blandishments. Although they largely have lost control over their
own information and have even less ability to bargain over the terms of their
contracts, consumers, likewise, have dramatically expanded their bargaining power
through information-gathering capabilities, an ability to monitor producer reputation
and quality, and the capacity to strike back at underperforming producers.
On the one hand, these new sources and forms of power merely complicate the
job of courts attempting to assess the parties’ bargaining power for purposes of
determining a contract’s enforceability under unconscionability, public policy,
reasonable expectations, duress, fraud, undue influence, and other doctrines based
upon explicit or implicit weighing of that relationship. Courts will likely continue to
attempt to apply the inequality of bargaining power doctrine to individual cases and
will continue to generate incoherent and indeterminate results. Perhaps, if we are
lucky, the Internet may provide the basis for determining that power relations are so
complex, so dynamic, so subject to the widely-varying activities of different
consumers at different times that we will finally abandon the doctrine in individual
cases. I’m not holding my breath.
But the neat thing about the Internet is that it makes everything “macro” – data is
the breath of the Internet and the blood of the information economy, and it is in the
nature of the beast to collect, collate process, and report this data. Since at least the
first third of the twentieth century, courts and legislatures have been shifting discrete
transaction types into and out of the core of contract law. In some cases, those
movements have reflected underlying systemic power relations, some well and some
not so well. The metaphor of bargaining power as a property right provides a unique
opportunity to reconceptualize that contract-based bargaining power heuristic that
has justified legislative-style movements such as insurance, banking and consumer
law. With a property-based approach to bargaining power, we potentially gain a
mechanism that addresses the discrete inputs available for each side to protect itself
and that can better assess the relative costs and benefits of current and future
legislative interferences with consumer contracts.
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